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THE SPLIT AWARD STATUTE:
A MOVE TOWARD EFFECTUATING THE
TRUE PURPOSE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
I. INTRODUCTION
The overriding goal of the American tort system is to compensate
individuals who have been injured by the acts of others.' Logically flowing
from this goal is the award of compensatory damages. Essentially,
compensatory damages are awarded with the intent to put plaintiffs back in the
position they would have been in had they not been injured.' Upon award of
compensatory damages, the plaintiff is considered to be whole.
3
Also in keeping with the intent of our tort system is the award of nominal
damages. Typically, nominal damages entail a trivial sum.4 Nominal damage
awards are generally small because they are meant only to represent the fact
finder's recognition that a plaintiff's legal right has been violated.'
Understanding the goals that underpin our tort system makes it difficult to
comprehend the concept of punitive damages.6 Unlike compensatory or nominal
1. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 at 5-6 (5th
ed. 1984); CHARLES T. MCCORIeCK, Handbook on the Law of Damages, DAMAGES § 77 at 275
(1935) [hereinafter McCORMICK].
2. Hughett v. Caldwell County, 230 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950). "Compensationis always
the aim of the law. It is the bottom principle of the law of damages. To restore the party injured,
as near as may be, to his former position is the purpose of allowing a money equivalent of his
property which has been taken, injured, or destroyed." Id. at 96.
3. Topmiller v. Cain, 657 P.2d 638, 641 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
4. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978). In this decision, the Supreme Court set forth
that nominal damages are awardable "without proof of actual injury." Id. Specifically, the Court
held that school children who were suspended without procedural due process were entitled to the
award of nominal damages, not to exceed one dollar. Id.
"Nominal damages are assessed in some trifling or trivial amount, such as six cents or one
dollar, an amount selected simply for the purpose of declaring an infraction of the plaintiff's rights
and the commission of a wrong." Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709, 714 (Del. 1967).
5. McClellan v. Highland Sales & Investment Co., 484 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1972). "The general
theory of nominal damages is that they should be allowed where a legal right has been invaded but
no actual damages were suffered or proved." Id. at 241.
6. Historically, punitive damages have also been referred to as "smart money." Fay v. Parker,
53 N.H. 342, 354 (1872). Initially, this term was meant to connotate that plaintiffs were entitled
to damage awards for the "smarts" they received from their injury. Id. at 354. Over time,
however, the term was redefined to refer to awarding damages to make defendants "smart." Id. at
355. Additionally, the terms "exemplary damages" or "vindictive damages" have been used
interchangeably by courts to describe punitive damages. Throughout this note, the term "punitive
473
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damages, which focus primarily on compensating the plaintiff, punitive damages
are awarded against defendants based on their outrageous conduct.' Also unlike
the award of compensatory or nominal damages, punitive damages are not
awarded as a matter of right." The purposes behind the award of punitive
damages are to punish defendants for their egregious conduct against society9
and to deter others from engaging in similar conduct in the future.' Given these
objectives, society is intended to be the ultimate beneficiary of awarding punitive
damages because in the process of carrying out these purposes, social order is
restored and subsequently maintained."
Because punitive damages focus on defendants' conduct and are intended
as punishment, their use in our civil system has been the subject of considerable
controversy.' 2 Historically, punitive damages have not been favored in the
damages" will be used.
7. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). '[Punitive damages] are not
compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible
conduct and to deter its future occurrence." Id. at 350. See generally 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages
§ 733 (1988).
8. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. A.M. Pugh Assoc., 604 F. Supp. 85 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
9. Smith v. Hill, 147 N.E.2d 321 (111. 1958). "[Punitive] damages [are] allowed in the interest
of society, and not to recompense solely the individual, to deny [punitive damages] cannot be said
to deny any constitutional right or to encroach upon any judicial function... * Id. at 327. See
also Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 532 P.2d 790, 794 (Or. 1975); Exxon Corp. v. Yarema,
516 A.2d 990, 1013 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
10. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979).
11. Eshelman v. Rawalt, 131 N.E. 675 (111. 1921). The court stated:
[Wihere [punitive] damages may be assessed they are allowed in the interest of society
in the nature of punishment, and as a warning and example to deter the defendant and
others from committing like offenses in the future, and a frequent objection to the
doctrine is in allowing an individual to recover and appropriate damages for an offense
against the social order and in the interest of society. This consideration enforces the
injunction of this court for watchfulness to see that the right is not abused.
Id. at 677.
12. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872). "The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is
an unsightly and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law." Id. at
382. What the court is referring to in the above quote is the award of punitive damages. Many
courts and opponents of punitive damages have since reiterated the views of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court in supporting the contention that the award of punitive damages is not a desirable
institution in the legal system. For a contemporary case advancing the views espoused in Fay, see,
e.g., Town of Hookset School Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. Supp. 126 (D.N.H. 1984).
But see Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18 (Wis. 1914):
The law giving [punitive] damages is an outgrowth of the English love of liberty
regulated by the law. It tends to elevate the jury as a responsible instrument of
government, discourages private reprisals, restrains the strong, influential and
unscrupulous, vindicates the rights of the weak, and encourages recourse to, and
confidence in the courts of the law by those wronged or oppressed by acts or practices
not cognizable in, or not sufficiently punished by the criminal law.
Id. at 20.
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law. 3 In fact, some courts and commentators argue that punitive damages are
criminal fines in disguise. 4 Essentially, these critics assert that penalties are
being assessed against defendants without the requisite procedural safeguards of
a typical criminal proceeding.' 5 Further, opponents of punitive damages argue
that plaintiffs, who have presumably been made whole by compensatory
damages, receive a "windfall" when defendants are required to remit their
punishment to plaintiffs.
16
For a more contemporary discussion of the debate, compare J. Ghirardi, Should Punitive
Damages Be Abolished?-A Statemetfor the Affirmative, ABA INS., NEOL. & COMP. LAw § 282
(1965) with P. Corboy, Should Punitive Damages Be Abolished?-A Statement for the Negative,
ABA INS., NEOL. & COMP. LAW § 282 (1965).
13. Alguire v. Walker, 506 N.E.2d 1334 (fI1. App. Ct. 1987). "Since punitive damages are
penal in nature, they are not favored in the law, and courts must exercise caution to see that punitive
damages are not improperly or unwisely awarded." Id. at 1342. See also First Nat'l Bank of Des
Plaines v. Amco Engineer Co., 335 N.E.2d 591 (Ill App. Ct. 1975). In First National, the court
did not deny the plaintiff the opportunity to seek punitive damages. Id. at 594. However, the court
did feel the need to express that punitive damages were not a favorite of the law. Id. The court
went on to explain that punitive damages are awarded in the interest of society and to punish the
defendant. Id. The plaintiff has no vested right to such an award. Id.
14. David L. Walther and Thomas A. Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kink v.
Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 369 (1965). This article contains an excellent summation of the history
of punitive damages and the debate concerning their use. Walther and Plein put forth the two classic
positions of the debate as represented by Sedgwick, who favored the use of punitive damages, and
Greenleaf, who was opposed to the doctrine. Id. at 379.
The authors then discuss their views on punitive damages. They assert that punitive damages
are inconsistent with the goals of our civil system which strives to indemnify tortfeasors. Id. at 382.
The article also addresses the private attorney general theory as a justification for awarding civil
penalties and rejects its validity. Id. Walther and Plein assert that any deficiencies in the criminal
system should not be remedied by putting more money in the plaintiff's pocket; instead, reform of
the criminal system should occur internally wherein prosecutors are allowed the time to "[protect]
society from wrongdoers" and administer any necessary punishment. Id.
15. For example, defendants who possibly face the imposition of punitive damage judgments
are not guaranteed the right to confront adverse witnesses; are not entitled to the protection against
self-incrimination; are not guaranteed to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof despite
being subject to punishment; and are not guaranteed to a trial by jury. Comment, Criminal
Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 408, 412-30 (1967). See also
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 56 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist,
in his dissent, also acknowledged the viability of the split award statute concept as a means to
eliminate the plaintiff's windfall. Justice Rehnquist stated: "Even assuming that a punitive damage
'fine' should be imposed after a civil trial, the penalty should go to the state, not to the
plaintiff-who by hypothesis is fully compensated." Id. at 59. See also infra note 26.
16. The plaintiff's windfall was identified as early as 1877 in Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,
42 Wis. 654 (1877). The court noted that "[i]t is difficult on principle to understand why, when the
sufferer by a tort has been fully compensated for his suffering, he should recover anything more.
And it is equally difficult to understand why, if the tortfeasor is to be punished by [punitive]
damages, they should go to the compensated sufferer, and not to the public in whose behalf he is
punished." Id. at 672.
For a more recent discussion of the plaintiff's windfall, see Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247 (1981). The Court was concerned that punitive damages afford the plaintiff with a
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Conversely, defenders of punitive damages assert that these damages are
needed to provide a remedy for conduct that is technically punishable in the
criminal courts, yet often is not considered serious enough to be pursued by
formal prosecution. 7 The wrongs committed by the defendant against society
must be compensated; therefore, punitive damages are awardable. "' To provide
an incentive for plaintiffs to pursue punishment of this conduct, proponents
assert that punitive damages should be awarded under the "private attorney
general" doctrine.' 9  In essence, the doctrine suggests that citizens are
encouraged to alert courts to conduct that violates public policy. Therefore,
punitive damages are awarded to plaintiffs as a civil reward.'
While the debate about punitive damages has existed for many years, for
the last twenty years such awards have been particularly scrutinized. In the
windfall that may be 'unpredictable and, at times, substantial." Id. at 270-71. In addition, the
Court contended that such a windfall would have the potential of burdening local treasuries. Id. at
271. The Court projected that such a strain would reduce services to the public at large. Id. This
concern, however, would be amply addressed through the implementation of a split award statute
(see infra note 26) because a portion of the punitive damage monies would be put toward improving
services within society. See also Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Arkansas Sheriff's Boys' Ranch, 655
S.W.2d 389, 391-92 (Ark. 1983) (holding that the plaintiff received a windfall because the plaintiff
was made whole upon the award of compensatory damages).
17. Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Report of the ABA Action Commission to Improve the Tort
Liabiity System, A.B.A. 1987 MIDYEAR MEETING, February 16-17, 1987 at 16 [hereinafter ABA
Report]; see also McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 77 at 276.
18. Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., 532 P.2d 790 (Or. 1975). "[Plunitive damages are
justified as a deterrent to prevent the violation of societal interests." Id. at 794.
19. In Kink v. Combs, 135 N.W.2d 789 (Wis. 1965), the Wisconsin Supreme Court established
that the award of punitive damages was necessary to insure that intolerable conduct would not go
unpunished. The court stated that the district attorney was not obligated to prosecute every case of
misconduct. Id. at 798. Thus, the court found that this left a void in criminal enforcement and,
therefore, plaintiffs were left to pursue the claims on their own. Id. The court further found that
the benefit of awarding punitive damages was twofold. First, the plaintiff had incentive to pursue
the claim. Id. Second, society was served by the plaintiffs pursuit of the claim because the
defendant's undesirable conduct was now going to be punished and a message of deterrence would
be sent. Id.
Some 25 years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reaffirmed its views in Wagen v. Ford
Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980). In Wagen, the court placed more emphasis on the
punitive damage award working as an incentive to the plaintiff. The court stated that Ford's
suggestion of paying punitive damages to the state treasury was not feasible. Id. at 454. The court
rejected this suggestion because the plaintiff would have no incentive to expend time, money, and
effort to bring the wrongdoer before the court because the plaintiff alone would have to incur the
costs of suit. Id. However, the court did concede that Ford's plan was an equitable solution to the
"race to the courthouse door" problem. Id. The Court recognized that plaintiffs suing at a later
date would have less opportunity to receive punitive damage awards, or compensatory for that
matter, from a defendant who already paid large punitive damages to previously victorious plaintiffs.
Id.
20. For a more complete discussion of the private attorney general theory, see infra notes 45-48
and accompanying text.
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wake of various state tort reform movements,21 the alleged "crisis" in the
liability insurance industry because of run-away jury awards, 2 and the recent
adjudication of various punitive damages issues before the Supreme Court,2
some states have attempted to modify the plaintiffs recovery of punitive
damages.' The modification has taken the form of statutory provisions that
21. Compare Andrew F. Popper, Point, 25 MD. B. J., March/April 1992, at 31 with Frank F.
Daily, Counterpoint, 25 MD. B. J., March/April 1992, at 34. The Popper article discusses why the
tort reform movement began and has subsequently gathered momentum. Popper also summarizes
the major goals of the movement and concludes that the Federal Tort Reform movement is not
needed nor is it desirable. On the other hand, the Daily article addresses Popper's "antagonism"
towards the tort reform movement and concludes that tort reform is necessary to "level the playing
field" for all participants.
22. For identification of what constitutes the alleged crisis and the debate over its existence, see
infra notes 68 and 73 and accompanying text in Section Im.
23. Within the last six years, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to four cases that address
the issue of punitive damages: Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988);
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991); and TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources, Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 2711 (1993). In Crenshaw, the Court had the opportunity to deal with the constitutionality of
punitive damages with respect to the Due Process, Contract, and Excessive Fines Clauses.
However, the Court would not rule on any of the issues because "those claims were not raised and
passed upon in [the] state court." Crenshaw, 486 U.S. at 71.
In the next session, the Court did reach the question of whether punitive damages violated the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. In Browning-Ferris, the Court held that the
Excessive Fines Clause did not apply to the award of punitive damages in a civil action that involved
private parties. Browning-Fernis, 492 U.S. at 262. The Court reasoned that the Excessive Fines
Clause was intended to limit government's abuse of exacting fines. Id. at 267. Specifically, the
Court stated, "[Tihe history of the Eighth Amendment convinces us that the Excessive Fines Clause
was intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the government." Id.
The Court seemed to imply that as long as the government is not directly a party to the action and
in no way directly imposing the fine, the Excessive Fines Clause will not apply to punitive damage
awards.
In 1991, the Court addressed the general question of the constitutionality of punitive damages.
Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1032. The Court held that the award of punitive damages by juries was
constitutional against a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process challenge. Id. at 1035. Finally, this
past term the Court rejected a bright-line mathematical formula for measuring the constitutionality
of punitive damages. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2712. In TXO, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
a $100 million punitive damage award that exceeded the compensatory award by more than 500
times. Id. While the Court admitted that "reasonableness" should be given proper consideration,
the Court would not confine juries to a mechanical arithmetic test to compute a punitive damage
award. Id.
Taken together, these four cases represent the Supreme Court's acknowledgementthat punitive
damages are, within certain limits, constitutionally viable and a "hot" legal topic in need of analysis
and reform.
24. To date, nine states have enacted a "split award" statute. See Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 13-21-102 (West 1986); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (2)-(4) (West 1986); Georgia, GA.
CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1)-(2) (1987); Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (1986);
Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(1)-(2) (West 1987); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e)
(1988); Missouri, Mo. Rsv. STAT. § 537.675 (1987); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 18.540 (1987);
and Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1989). Additionally, three states are attempting to join
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award the plaintiff only a percentage of the punitive damage judgment, thereby
reducing the plaintiff's "windfall," while awarding the remaining percentage
either to a specific governmental agency or to a general state fund.25
The fundamental purpose behind these statutes, to compensate society for
the injury inflicted by the defendant, is sound. However, certain constitutional
problems are presented. Specifically, the split award statute' has been found
to be inconsistent with both the Takings Clause" and the Excessive Fines
Clause.' In addition to constitutional concerns, the problem of appropriate jury
instruction has arisen. 2'
This Note will argue that split award statutes are desirable because they
carry out the true purpose of punitive damages, specifically, compensation of the
public for the wrongs inflicted by defendants' conduct and the maintenance of
social order. First, an overview of punitive damages and the historical
development of the doctrine will be presented.' ° Section II will conclude by
setting forth the current status of punitive damages. In Section III, this Note
will then outline the various factors that led to a need for the award of punitive
damages to be reformed.31 In Section IV, this Note will examine the nine split
award statutes currently in existence.32 This Note will then analyze the cases that
challenge these statutes in Section V.33 Section VI will conclude with a
proposed model statute that cures the perceived problems with split award
statutes and offers a novel disbursement scheme to further the purpose of
benefitting society with the award of punitive damages.'
the trend by enacting legislation to create a split award statute. Texas, Indiana, and New Jersey all
have bills pending.
25. For a specific analysis of the split award statute construction, see infra section IV of this
note.
26. This note defines a "split award statute" as a legislative enactment that mandates, upon
entry of judgment against a defendant for punitive damages, that the monies collected are to be split,
in varying percentages, between the state and the plaintiff. For a specific analysis of the nine
currently enacted split award statutes, see infra notes 95-122 and accompanying text.
27. In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "[Nior
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
28. The Eighth Amendmentprovides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
29. See, e.g., Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 797 P.2d 1019 (Or. 1990).
30. See infra notes 35-64 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 65-94 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 95-122 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 123-91 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 192-223 and accompanying text.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF PUNIrIVE DAMAGES
A. The Historical Roots
The award of punitive damages was a concept developed from the English
common law35 and was grounded in public policy.' At common law, punitive
damages were primarily awarded only upon a showing of malice, oppressive
conduct or gross fraud.37 Having found that the defendant's conduct exceeded
ordinary negligence, the fact finder justified the award of punitive damages
based on one of three rationales. First, the fact finder wanted to punish
defendants for their outrageous conduct.' Therefore, the award of punitive
damages was used as a vehicle for expressing outrage at the defendants'
conduct.39 Second, the award of punitive damages was meant to make an
35. Actually, the doctrine of punitive damages was developed some four thousand years ago
in the Sumerian, Arkadian, and Babylonian civilizations. Steven J. Sensibar, Punitive Damages: A
Look at Origins and Legitimacy, 41 FED. OF INS. & CORP. COUNSEL QUARTERLY 375, 378 (1991).
However, to remain within the scope of this note, only an examination of the English common law
doctrine of punitive damages and its origins will be made.
Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763), is acknowledged as one of the earliest cases
in English common law to allow the award of punitive damages. The plaintiff brought actions of
trespass, assault, and imprisonment against the defendant. The jury awarded the plaintiff 300
pounds for an injury usually awarded only 20 pounds. The court, in allowing the jury award of
punitive damages, held that the jury was not confined to awarding only compensatory damages. Id.
at 768-69. The court reasoned that it was within the province of the jury to assess damages against
the defendant for outrageous conduct. Id.
36. The primary public policy was to render punishment against the defendant and to prevent
similar conduct in the future for the benefit of society. In Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.
1763), a case decided the same year as Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768, the court specifically set forth
this policy: "Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as
punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future and as a proof of the
detestation of the jury to the action itself." Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498-99. Notice, additionally,
that punitive damages were intended to be an outlet for society to express outrage at the defendant's
conduct.
37. Wiggins v. Coffin, 3 Story 1 (1836), cited in KENNETH REDDEN & LNDA L. SCULUETER,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 1.4(A) at 16 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter PUNITIVE DAMAGES], set forth that
punitive damages were not awardable when a defendant was merely negligent. See generally
Theodore Sedgwick, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES §§ 363-370 (8th ed. 1891). This
common law practice has continued in current American jurisprudence. See David G. Owen,
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 1258, 1265-66 (1976).
38. Tullidge v. Wade, 3 Wils. K.B. 18 (C.P. 1769), cited in PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note
37, § 1.3(D) at 10. In fact, the court expressed that the level of the fact finder's outrage should
correlate to the amount of the punitive damage award: "Mhe circumstances of time and place,
when and where the insult is given requires different damages, as it is a greater insult to be beaten
upon the Royal Exchange than in a private room." Id.; see also McNamara v. King, 7 111. 432
(1845) (holding that punitive damages are awardable to punish the defendant and that the amount of
the award must be determined on a case by case basis). id. at 436.
39. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1990) [hereinafter, Daniels, Myth & Reality].
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example of the defendant and to deter others from engaging in similar conduct
in the future.40 Finally, punitive damages were intended to prevent individuals
from taking matters into their own hands4" by providing money to plaintiffs for
nonpecuniary, intangible losses.' Underlying each one of these justifications
was the ultimate goal of restoring and preserving social order.
Historically, the justification for awarding punitive damages directly to the
plaintiff was to create a bounty for citizens to bring forth minor criminal
offenses that were not likely to be prosecuted, yet nonetheless were offensive to
social mores and in need of punishment.' This bounty system is now known
as the "private attorney general" doctrine.' In theory, the bounty was
intended to be a public reward to plaintiffs for fulfilling their civic duty.'
40. Coryell v. Colbough, 1 NJ (Coxe) 77 (1791), cited in PUNUrvE DAMAGES, supra note 37,
§ 1.4(A) at 15, is credited with being the first American case to allow the award of punitive
damages. Id. In Coryell, the plaintiff brought suit for breach of a promise to marry. The jury was
instructed to assess damages not based solely on suffering or actual loss. Id. Instead, the jury was
told to award damages "for example's sake, to prevent such offences in the future." Id.
41. Merst v. Harvey, 5 Taunt 422 (C.P. 1814), cited in PUNMVE DAMAGES, supra note 37,
§ 1.3(E) at 11. "I remember a case where the jury gave 500 pounds, for merely knocking a man's
hat off; and the courts refused a new trial .. .[The award of punitive damages] goes to prevent the
practice of duelling, if the jury are permitted to punish insult by exemplary damages." Id.
A more recent case setting forth the same principle was Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co.
v. M.B. Kahn Const. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64, 105 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1981)
(stating that under South Carolina law, punitive damages served as a "private revenge carried out
in courts rather than duels or in back alleys").
See also MARILYN MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS, at § 40.13 (1992)
(discussing more recent cases that also subscribe to the notion that punitive damages are necessary
to prevent revenge).
42. Punitive damages were viewed as a supplement when the plaintiff's actual damages would
be relatively small. For example, punitive damages have been awarded for the indignity of being
spat on in a courthouse, being defamed by an adversary and being the subject of a beating. ABA
Repori, supra note 17, at 16.
See, e.g., Benson v. Frederick, 3 Burr 1845 (K.B. 1776), died in PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra
note 37, § 1.3(D) at 10. The court held that punitive damages were awardable because the plaintiff
was wrongfully flogged. Id. The result was scandal and disgrace to the plaintiff. Id.
43. Winkler v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 168 A.2d 418 (N.J. Super. 1961). "[Punitive]
damages are allowed to punish the wrongdoer for a wilful act and to vindicate the rights of a party
in substitution for personal revenge, thus safeguarding the public peace." Id. at 422.
44. McCoRMcK, supra note 1, § 77 at 276. See, e.g., Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S.
42, 48 (1979) (holding that punitive damages encourage plaintiffs to assert their legal rights by
providing a bounty to bring the lawsuit).
45. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
46. Tideway Oil Programs v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454 (Miss. 1983). In Tideway, the Mississippi
Supreme Court specified that the award of punitive damages to a plaintiff should be reserved for
only those cases where the plaintiff has endured "great trouble and personal expense." Id. at 461.
In particular, the court believed that punitive damages were only appropriate when the plaintiff had
rendered a service to the community by bringing forth the defendant's egregious conduct. Id.
See also Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985). The Maine Supreme Court hailed
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In practice the private attorney general doctrine has been distorted and
abused. As Harvard Law Professor Clarence Morris noted many years ago,
plaintiffs are often not inspired by the goal of identifying outrageous conduct for
the public benefit.47 Instead, plaintiffs seem to be induced into presenting
inflammatory evidence against a defendant with the hope of increasing the
plaintiffs own award.' Such a practice hardly seems in keeping with the goals
of punitive damages. Rather, this practice adds credence to the public
perception that punitive damages are nothing but a windfall to plaintiffs. This
abuse of the private attorney general doctrine is a contributing factor as to why
reform of punitive damages is necessary.
Another common law rationale for awarding punitive damages directly to
the plaintiff, related to the private attorney general doctrine, was to fill certain
voids in the legal system.49 In the early days of the common law, the primary
gap-filling function served by punitive damages was providing monetary awards
for nonpecuniary losses like mental anguish, insult, or humiliation.' However,
the private attorney general theory as an excellent supplement to the enforcement of criminal laws
because the award of punitive damages encouraged private individuals to enforce society's rules.
Id. at 1358. The court used the private attorney general theory as a specific tool to ward off the
defendant's contention that the plaintiff received a windfall. Id.
47. Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173 (1931).
Professor Morris contended that plaintiffs are not driven by the same goals as public prosecutors.
Id. at 1178. It is true, as Morris conceded, that both plaintiffs and prosecutors benefit when
defendants are punished for the wrongful conduct brought by them before the court. Id.
Specifically, plaintiffs receive an award of punitive damages while prosecutors are permitted to keep
their salaried job. Id. However, as Morris noted, there is a crucial difference between the
motivations driving each of these actors. Id. The prosecutor's motivation is to obtain convictions
regardless of how gentle or severe the punishment may be. Id. Meanwhile, the plaintiff, although
acting as a "private attorney general," is extremely interested in the degree of punishment the
defendant receives because the greater the degree of punishment, the larger the plaintiff's punitive
damage award will be. Id. It has been the chronic abuse of this theory by plaintiffs that has focused
so much attention on the plaintiff's "windfall" when punitive damages are awarded. Id.
48. Id. Morris admitted that it is conceivable that the evidence the plaintiff introduces will
have marginal probative value toward assessing the punishment against the defendant. However,
it is more likely, Morris predicted, that the nature of the evidence, offered by the plaintiff with the
express intention of stirring the emotions of the jury, would create so much prejudice as to outweigh
any remote probative value the evidence might have. Id.
49. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
50. For example, in Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351 (Tex. 1885), punitive
damages were awardable for the mental anguish suffered by the plaintiff. In Satan, the defendant
failed to deliver a telegram to the plaintiff concerning a sick relative who later died. The court
allowed the award of punitive damages for the mental distreas suffered by the plaintiff because
although the harm suffered could not be computed with precision, the pain suffered was proximately
caused by the defendant's wilful conduct. Id. at 352-53. Punitive damages were often awarded
when the plaintiff suffered a similar type of non-pecuniary loss. See generally PUNITIvE DAMAGES,
supra note 37, § 1.3(D) at 10.
Both Connecticut and Michigan still subscribe to the notion that punitive damages are
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the need for this function has waned with the onset of the award of damages for
pain and suffering, 1 mental distress,52 and most recently, hedonic damages.53
A second gap-filling function served by the award of punitive damages was
to address the void in the legal system for payment of the plaintiff's attorney's
fees. Essentially, commentators began to question how a plaintiff could be
considered "whole" following a lawsuit when the plaintiff was still obligated to
pay attorney's fees.' 4 The award of punitive damages was therefore further
justified as a method to defray the plaintiff's legal costs and to keep the
plaintiff's compensatory award intact.55
awardable as additional compensation to the plaintiff. See Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, 364
N.W.2d 600 (Mich. 1984). In Peisner, an attorney sought compensatory and punitive damages in
a defamation suit against a newspaper. The court held that the jury could award both compensatory
and punitive damages for injured feelings without being duplicative. Id. at 604. The court reasoned
that punitive damages awarded for injured feelings "pick up where [compensatory] damages leave
off." Id. at 605. The court did, however, explicitly condition the award of these punitive damages,
above and beyond compensatory damages, to being a reflection of the outrage at the defendant's
conduct. Id. See also Markey v. Santangelo, 485 A.2d 1305, 1308 (Conn. 1985) (holding that
punitive damages are intended to help a plaintiff defray reasonable expenses incurred in the
litigation).
These two states represent a severe minority in viewing punitive damages as compensatory.
However, it should be noted that both states, like all other states, emphasize the egregious nature
of the defendant's conduct when calculating the punitive damage award.
51. Cartwright v. Atlas Chem. Indust., Inc., 593 P.2d 104 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978). The court
held that pain and suffering compensationwas within "the sound discretion of the jury because there
is no market where pain and suffering are bought and sold, nor any standard by which compensation
for it can be definitely ascertained, or the amount actually endured determined." Id. at 118.
52. Horan v. Klein's Sheridan, Inc., 211 N.E.2d 116, 118 (III. App. Ct. 1965) (holding that
the plaintiff could recover damages for the embarrassment and mental anguish associated with the
disfigurement caused by the defendant's conduct).
53. Hedonic damages are awarded for the loss of enjoyment of life or depreciation of the quality
of life because of the injury suffered by the plaintiff. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 391 (6th ed.
1990). For a discussion of what hedonic damages encompass and their current usage in various state
jurisdictions, see Kyle R. Crowe, 7he Semantical Bifurcation of Noneconomic Loss: Should Hedonic
Damage Be Recognized Independently of Pain and Suffering Damage?, 75 IowA L. REv. 1275
(1990).
54. McCoRIcK, supra note 1, § 77 at 278. See also Central Armature Works v. Am.
Motorist Ins. Co., 520 F. Supp. 283, 296 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that reimbursing the plaintiff for
attorney fees and associated costs were to be a factor in the determination of punitive damages
awards).
55. For an additional case citing this principle, see Kelsey v. Conn. State Employees Assoc.,
427 A.2d 420, 425 (Conn. 1980) (holding that the award of punitive damages was to be determined
based on the extent of the plaintiff's litigation expenses). See generally MINZER ET AL., supra note
41, at § 40.14.
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B. Current Status
Awards of punitive damages are in a period of transition. However, the
English common law themes of deterrence and punishment for the benefit of
society remain constant.m One current trend among the states is to make the
award of punitive damages more difficult to obtain by raising the standard of
proof.57 Implementing such a reform addresses the concern that punitive
damages lack procedural safeguards for the defendant.-
Other states have placed an absolute cap on the dollar figure awardable for
punitive damages." This measure is an overt attempt by state legislatures to
curtail the "excessive" jury award. However, certain risks are associated with
this reform, such as infringing on the jury's province to determine the award
56. Dorsey Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
1 (1982). After studying judicial opinions and additional commentary, Professor Ellis, a leading
commentator on punitive damages, found that punitive damages in their "modern" use are meant to:
punish the defendant; act as a deterrent to that specific defendant from repeating the punished
conduct in the future; act as a general deterrent to society that such conduct was not acceptable;
preserve societal peace; induce citizens to aid in enforcing the law; compensate victims for typically
uncompensable losses; and pay the plaintiff's attorney's fees. Based on these apparent generalized
goals, each individual state has developed methods to implement the purposes most important to
them. Id. at 3.
57. As of 1992, 28 states had enacted a "clear and convincing" standard of proof. Tennessee
Supreme Court Raises Evidence Standard for Punitive Damages and Requires Trial Bifurcation,
PUNITIVE DAMAGE UPDATE (ATRA, Washington, D.C.), May 6, 1992 at 3 (on file with the
Valparaiso University Law Review). See, e.g., Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896
(Tenn. 1992). The Tennessee Supreme Court held that punitive damages could only be awarded
upon showing with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted intentionally, fraudulently,
maliciously, or recklessly. Id. at 901.
Implementing an even stricter standard, Colorado currently requires proving a punitive damage
claim beyond a reasonable doubt before any judgment will be entered. See Boulder Valley School
Dist. R-2 v. Price, 805 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1991).
58. Bruce Fein and William Bradford Reynolds, Nothing Civil about Punitive Damages, 11
LEGAL TIMEs 16, Feb. 27, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Lglnew File. This article
presents various case law where the award of punitive damages has exceeded the maximum criminal
fine that could have been imposed had criminal action been taken. Fein also presents all the
procedural safeguards that he believes a defendant should be entitled to in the face of such
punishment. He reports that such measures are necessary to remove the "blatant discrimination
against successful businesses" who have become the victim of the deep pockets syndrome.
59. At least eighteen states currently have some version of a "cap" on the amount of punitive
damages that can be obtained. Arizona and Nevada State Legislatures Enact Punitive Damages
Reform Legislation, PUNIvE DAMAoEs UPDATE (ATRA, Washington, D.C.), June 12, 1989 at 2.
The success of the caps has been mixed. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665
(Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985) (upholding a $250,000 cap on the award of
noneconomic damages such as punitive damages). But see Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio
1991) (holding that a $200,000 cap on noneconomic damages violated due process rights); Smith
v. Department of Insurance, 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (holding that the right of access to the
courts was violated by a $450,000 cap on noneconomic damages).
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and removing some "desirable" uncertainty as to the amount of the award.'
Still other states, like Michigan and Connecticut, have placed a limit on the
award of punitive damages by confining the award to the payment of the
plaintiff's attorney's fees, or in some instances, to the recovery for indignity and
humiliation."' The most extreme anti-punitive damage award measure,
currently adopted by five states, has been to absolutely bar the recovery of
punitive damages in the absence of a statute specifically permitting their
award.' Although extreme, this measure passes constitutional muster because
60. Uncertainty as to the amount of the punitive damage award is desirable because it prevents
defendants, particularly corporations, from engagingin cost-benefit analyses that affect their conduct.
This concern is especially salient in products liability cases where defendants are faced with safety
precaution decisions. See generally Owen, supra note 37. Owen asserts that in the last twenty years
the award of punitive damages has been on the rise in product liability cases because of defendant
corporations' disregard for public safety. Id. at 1258. This article contains excellent sources and
examples of cases where defendant corporations have put products into the market despite having
knowledge that adequate tests have not been conducted on the products. Id. at 1261. It seems that
corporations have no difficulty conducting business in flagrant disregard for the public welfare. Id.
One particular example offered by Owen indicates the cost-benefit analysis engaged in by
defendant corporations. In Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cen. denied,
424 U.S. 913 (1976), as cited in Owen, supra note 37, at 1355, a 75-year-old woman was severely
burned when her television caught fire. The defendant-manufacturerwas shown to have known that
a high voltage transformer included in each set was prone to catch fire. The evidence further
illustrated that the cost to eliminate the hazard, per unit, was one dollar. The court found that,
because the defendant manufacturer failed to warn consumers of the hazard and neglected to recall
the units, the award of punitive damages was valid. Id. at 109. Owen asserts that defendants do
not take these precautionary measures because of the high costs associated with conducting a recall
and subsequently redressing the defect. Owen, supra note 37, at 1361.
The point is that imposing definite "cap" limitations upon the amount of punishment the
defendant will receive for outrageous conduct similar to that found in Gillham seems to encourage
the use of a cost-benefit analysis. In a "cap" state, a corporation has the ability to estimate how
many potential lawsuits will be brought in connection with the defect, then can calculate with
precision what the cost of not fixing the defect will be. Essentially this allows the corporation to
reduce the concern for societal safety to an issue of economics.
61. See, e.g., Kelsey v. Conn. State Employees Assoc., 427 A.2d 420 (Conn. 1980) (holding
that the award of punitive damages was to be determined based on the extent of the plaintiff's
litigation expenses); Riggs v. Fremont Mutual Ins. Co., 270 N.W.2d 654, 655 (Mich. Ct. App.
1978) (holding that punitive damages were awardable as compensation for the humiliation and
indignity inflicted by the defendant's egregious conduct).
62. See Killebrew v. Abbott Laboratories, 359 So. 2d 1275, 1278 (La. 1978) (stating that
punitive damages are not recoverable in Louisiana unless a statute expressly authorizes such an
award for "some particular wrong"); Lowell v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 47 N.E.2d 265, 271
(Mass. 1943) (holding that punitive damages are not awardable unless authorized by statute); Miller
v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Neb. 1975) (holding that Nebraska law does not allow for the
recovery of punitive damages); Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d 66, 68 (N.H. 1972)
(holding that no damages to deter or punish were awardable, rather only compensatory damages
could be recovered); Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Products, 436 P.2d 186, 187 (Wash. 1968) (holding
that the doctrine of punitive damages was unsound and that absent a statutory provision, punitive
damages could not be recovered).
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plaintiffs are not entitled to the award of punitive damages as a matter of
right. 0
Rather than allowing outrageous conduct to go unpunished, implementation
of a split award statute is the solution to the problem with which many state
legislators are currently grappling. At a very minimum, the split award statute
comes closest to carrying out the goals of punitive damages as set forth by
Professor Ellis." Specifically, the split award statute compels the defendant
to repay society for the harms inflicted by the defendant's conduct while still
allowing the plaintiff to receive a share of the award for payment of attorney
fees and receipt of a civic reward.
III. WHY PUNITIVE DAMAGES HAVE BECOME THE EYE OF THE STORM
Convincing the courts and legal scholars of the benefits the split award
statute offers may be a difficult task because punitive damages have never been
completely accepted or well-received within the legal community.' However,
the task may be especially arduous because within the last fifteen years punitive
damages have become the subject of heightened judicial scrutiny and heated
debate.' One commentator, Professor Stephen Daniels,' suggests that this
recent phenomena is attributable to the rhetoric of an "insurance crisis" of the
mid-1980s' and the reality of various tort reform movements' taking place
63. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the criticisms that have
been raised about punitive damage awards.
66. For a general discussion of this phenomena, see Brian L. Lahargoue, The Need for Federal
Legislative Reforms of Punnive Damages, 20 Sw. U. L. REv. 103 (1991); Neil K. Komesar, Injuries
and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (1990); Melvin M.
Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present Day Society, 49
UMKC L. REv. 1 (1980).
67. Professor Daniels has been involved with a number of empirical studies concerning jury
verdicts where punitive damages have been awarded. For a more in-depth appreciation of his
studies, see Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Empirical Patterns in Punitive Damage Cases: A
Description of Incidence Rates & Awards, 1 AMER. BAR FOUNDATION WORKING PAPER SERIES No.
8705 (1988); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Jury Verdicts and the "Crisis " in C1iil Justice, 11
JUST. SY. J. 321 (1986); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Punitive Damage Dilemma in
Products Liability Cases: Fact or Fiction, PRODS. LIA. COMMENTARY & CASES, Aug. 1986 at 14.
68. Meanwhile, other special interest groups like the American Tort Reform Association,
contend that the insurance liability crisis is not a myth. Additionally, the Florida Bar Journal cited
the insurance crisis as a specific reason for the enactment of the Florida split award statute. See
Lawrence King, Enforcement of Florida's Punitive Damage Sharing Statute-Is it Constitutional?,
FLA. BAR J., Nov. 1991 at 62. See infra note 73 for a discussion of the many facets of the
insurance crisis debate.
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in the states."'
As with any controversial topic, two distinct views of punitive damages
have emerged. On the one hand, supporters of punitive damages, like Professor
Daniels, claim that punitive damages are not detrimental to the United States'
economic stability7' and are the victim of "politicization" of the issue.72 On the
other hand, opponents of punitive damages, advocating reform of the tort
system, contend that punitive damage awards are the cause of the liability
insurance crisis,' encourage "runaway" jury verdicts,74 and impede the
69. See Record on 'Reform' Mixed in the Courts, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 9, 1992 at 34-37. This
article offers an excellent state-by-state analysis of tort reform measures that have undergone judicial
scrutiny. The list is quite exhaustive, providing the outcome of: damage cap decisions, attempts
to restrict the collateral source rule, and implementation of mandatory periodic payments. -
70. Daniels, Myth & Reality, supra note 39, at 3. Daniels also suggests that these two factors
have changed the nature of the debate from one previously centering on a doctrinal discussion of
punitive damages to a debate concerning the negative impact that high punitive damage awards have
on society. Id.
71. Id. Daniels claims that reformers attempt to create this perception through the use of
'horror stories." Id. at 16-17. One such "horror story" occurred in Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 576
N.E.2d 1146 (IIl. App. Ct. 1991). In Kemner, a jury awarded 63 plaintiffs one dollar in nominal
damages for personal damages caused by a wood preservative. The jury then awarded a substantial
$16.5 million in punitive damages to the plaintiff. Id.
72. Daniels contends that political action committees and other various interest groups who were
greatly effected by the award of punitive damage awards came together in the 1980s to mobilize their
efforts for change in state legislatures. Daniels, Myth & Reality, supra note 39, at 10. The
reformers created a mentality that drastic change was necessary in the civil justice system by
manipulating the public and tactically stirring their emotions. Id. at 12. In essence, Daniels
explained, the reformers created a smoke screen of the true issues by convincing the public to use
'feeling rather than thought." Id. at 13. Such a technique is typically used by propagandists to
accomplish their ends. As one author notes, "public policies rest on the beliefs and perceptions of
those who help make them whether or not those cognitions are accurate." MURRAY EDELMAN,
POLITICAL LANGUAGB: WORDS THAT SUCCEED AND POLICIES THAT FAIL 9 (1977).
73. The debate concerning the existence of an insurance liability crisis is a topic so vast that
it reaches far beyond the scope of this note. Although the list is in no way comprehensive, a
sampling of the different viewpoints concerning the controversy follows.
See Dominick Vetri, The Integration of Torr Law Reforms and Liabilizy Insurance Ratemaing
in the New Age, 66 OR. L. REV. 277 (1987). Vetri argues that an insurance crisis has in fact
developed. The article asserts that fast paced changes have occurred in tort law without
accommodating the insurance industry with a satisfactory time period to make rate adjustments.
Although he specifically cites increased claims and excessive jury awards as contributing factors of
the crisis, Vetri also allots a portion of the blame to insurance companies for being somewhat
clandestine about actual losses incurred. Id. at 291. In turn, the article contends, it is difficult for
the industry to set fair rates for consumers. Id. at 295. Vetri's solution to the problem is to have
mandatory disclosure by insurance companies and comprehensive studies examining the effects that
substantive changes in tort law would have on the insurance industry. Id. at 295-96.
See also Stephen Wermiel, Costs of Lawsuits Growing, Blamed for Rising Insurance Rates,
132 CHI. DAILY L. BULL. 1, June 9, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. This
article represents the epitome of the parade of horribles theory. Wermiel offers various statistics
to illustrate the hardships experienced by insurance companies faced with rising costs because of
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 1 [1993], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss1/10
1993] SPLIT AWARD STATUTE 487
research and development process of "big business."" An additional
interesting point raised by opponents of punitive damages is that plaintiffs use
the filing of a punitive damage claim as a "bargaining chip" during settlement
discussions.'
lawsuits. For example, the article cites a study, conducted by Tillinghast, Nelson, & Warren,
indicating that insurers and large corporations paid $66.5 billion in 1984, or 1.76% of the gross
national product, in attorneys fees and damages. Wermiel also suggests that a change in legal
attitude and theory have contributed to the crisis. Finally, the article acknowledges that consumers
are the ultimate losers in the wake of the crisis because they are forced to pay higher prices.
But compare Group says Insurance Premiums a 'Hoax', 132 CHI. DAILY L. BULL. 1, April
7, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. At the other extreme of the debate, this
article explains that the insurance liability crisis was the creation of the insurance industry because
of low interest rates and slower markets. Robert Creamer, executive director of Illinois Public
Action Counsel, warned Illinois taxpayers that insurance premiums were not rising because of
runaway jury verdicts, but because the insurance industry was trying to achieve the "biggest con of
the decade." Id.
Offering a middle ground on this debate are David J. Nye & Donald G. Gifford, 7he Myth
of the Liability Insurance Claims Explosion: An Empirical Rebuttle, 31 CORP. PRACTICE
COMMENTATOR 201 (1989-1990). This article offers an excellent synopsis of the perceived crisis.
The authors present empirical evidence to support the insurance industry's complaint of increased
claims being filed in recent years. Id. at 214. However, they assert that the problems in the
industry are more attributable to an unhealthy tenacity on the part of insurance companies in refusing
to settle claims thereby forcing litigation and increasing their own costs. Id.
74. "Hardly a day goes by that we do not hear or read of the dramatic increase in the number
of lawsuits filed, or of the latest multimillion dollar verdict, or of another small business, child care
center, or municipal corporation that has had its insurance canceled out from under it." 132 CONG.
REC. S948 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1986). The above quote was made by Senator Mitch McConnell, of
Kentucky, who was laying the ground work for the introduction of the Litigation Abuse Reform Act
of 1986. Senator McConnell continued by relaying various "horror stories" associated with
excessive jury awards and eagerly litigious individuals that had helped to create the liability crisis.
Id.
But see Mare Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986)
(challenging the assertion that America is a litigious society and encouraging a rational look at the
societal benefits served by litigation).
75. Richard J. Mahcaey & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial: Punitive Damages
Versus New Products, 246 SCIENCE 1395 (December 15, 1989). Mahoney and Littlejohn assert that
strict liability and inflated jury awards have had a severely adverse impact on the research and
development of new products. Id. at 1395. The authors report that "seven figure jury awards on
claims without merit are enough to send shivers down anyone's spine." Id. Mahoney and Littlejohn
further contend that health care, aviation, and basic research are the areas suffering the greatest harm
by the uncertainty of the punitive damage awards. Id. at 1397. In particular, they report that the
development of "future" drugs is deteriorating because of "the extremely high cost of vaccine-related
injuries." Id. For this reason, the National Academy of Science has found that little derivation from
traditional vaccines will be used to cure AIDS. Id. Additionally, Mahoney and Littlejohn conclude
that a similar trend of "conservatism" has developed in the medical equipment industry, the general
aviation industry, and the "basic research" industry. Id.
76. See generally Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 75. Mahoney reports that plaintiffs who
had sought punitive damages were 150% more likely to obtain a settlement agreement than those
cases where no punitive damages were claimed. Id. at 1396. Additionally, Mahoney found that in
conjunction with a higher likelihood to obtain a settlement, plaintiffs seeking punitive damages
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Both groups offer statistics to support their claim as to what the fate of
punitive damage awards should be. The reformers offer a study conducted by
the RAND Corporation Institute for Civil Justice in 1987. 77 The report was
a compilation of statistics on jury verdicts where punitive damages were awarded
in Cook County, Illinois, and San Francisco, California, from 1960 to 1984.
The RAND report found that the award of punitive damages and the amount of
the average award had significantly increased in recent years.' For example,
the RAND report found that Cook County, Illinois, experienced an 800 percent
increase in the award of punitive damages in the 1980s. 7' The report also
found that the high frequency of awarding punitive damages occurred primarily
in business and contract cases.s' The other main observation made in the
RAND report was that a severe increase in the size of the punitive damage
award had occurred."'
While some may find the statistics produced by RAND and other reform
advocates to be persuasive, others may find that the studies conducted by
punitive damage supporters are equally persuasive despite the great disparity
between the two views. For example, Professor Daniels has been involved with
a number of studies' finding that punitive damages do not represent a serious
problem in the judicial system.' His most recent findings indicate that,
contrary to what the reformers reported, juries were not always inclined to
award punitive damages, and when such awards were made, no consistent
increases took place."' In specific response to the contentions of the reformers,
Daniels noted that juries were least likely to award punitive damages in personal
injury cases, "even if [the] case involved medical malpractice or products
tended to receive 60% more from the settlement. Id.
77. MARK PETERSON Er AL., PUNIvE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, 1987 [hereinafter
RAND].
78. RAND, supra note 77, at iii.
79. Id. at 14. In fact, the report found that the award of punitive damages was six times as
much as, in the span of four years, than it was during the past twenty years combined. Id.
80. Id. at 13. Interestingly, however, the RAND report conceded that the award of punitive
damages in personal injury cases did not increase in frequency or dollar amount. Id. at 65.
81. Id. Specifically, RAND reported that Cook County experienced an inflation-adjusted
increase in the average punitive damage award from $43,000 in 1965-69 to $729,000 in 1980-84.
Relevant Studies on Ton Reform/Puitive Damages, PUNITIVE DAMAGE UPDATE (ATRA,
Washington, D.C.(n.d.)). This amounts to a 1500% increase. Id. The report did, however,
concede that punitive damage awards in products liability claims did not experience an increase over
the last 25 years. RAND, supra note 77, at 12. In fact, punitive damage awards were only awarded
in four San Francisco product liability cases and only in two Cook County cases. Id. at 12.
82. See supra note 39 and accompanying text for the citation of these studies.
83. Daniels, Myth & Reality, supra note 39, at 2.
84. Id. at 61. Daniels' data was based on 25,627 civil jury verdicts from state trial courts in
27 counties of 11 states over a period of four years. Id. at 28.
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liability."s'
Two additional groups have come forward with studies that support the
award of punitive damages. The Association of American Trial Lawyers asserts
that the award of punitive damages has been relatively rare.s" In fact, the
Association reported that as of 1989, only 110 punitive damage awards exceeded
$100,000 within the last thirty years.' Additionally, the General Accounting
Office (GAO), at the direction of the House Subcommittee on Commerce,
Consumer Protection and Competitiveness, conducted a study examining the
size, cost, and frequency of damage awards.sa The GAO found that of the 305
cases studied, only twelve punitive damage awards were appealed and all were
subsequently reversed or remanded." Further, the GAO reported that seventy-
one percent of the cases involving an award of punitive damages in excess of $1
million were reduced on appeal.'
The debate between these two groups and the production of statistics will
probably continue well into the future. However, the position eventually found
to be more meritorious concerning this debate is irrelevant to the viability of
split award statutes. 9' The debate between the two groups focuses primarily
85. Id. at 43.
86. Elizabeth Grillo Olsen, Punitive Damages: How Much is Too Much?, BUSINESS WEEK,
March 27, 1989, at 18.
87. Id.
88. Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Study Says Punitive Awards Aren't Excessive, NAT'L
LAW JOURNAL, November 27, 1989, at 5. The study consisted of 305 cases in five states where a
jury verdict was returned between 1983-85. Id. The study presented other findings concerning
compensatory damage awards that are beyond the scope of this note.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Stuart M. Gerson, Both Sides are Wrong on Tort Reform, So What's Right?, 131 N.J. L.J.
15, May 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. This article comes to much the
same conclusion drawn in this Note. The debate concerning the existence of a crisis will continue
to rage. Although the article does not specifically address the split award statute, this Note concurs
with Gerson that the general public is not currently benefitting from the in-fighting between the two
camps. He further argues that individuals must encourage state reforms of "the system" to make
it work more effectively for the benefit of the public.
Gerson cites a specific example as to how the American public is the one truly suffering in
the midst of the debate. He reports that in the area of obstetric care, over $20 billion have been paid
out in costs and in defense of medical malpractice claims. Because of this problem, obstetric and
gynecologist professionals are faced with increased insurance premiums.
Consequently, there has been a significant drop in services since 1987. In particular, 12.4%
of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists physicians stopped practicing altogether,
while up to half of the remaining Ob-Gyn professions reduced services to women that were
categorized as "high risk." Another startling fact offered by Gerson is that in 67 counties of
Georgia, women do not have access to "a single Ob-Gyn." Id.
Therefore, the women most in need of the services are the individuals who are really suffering
from the perception that an "insurance crisis" exists. Hypothetically, if the states that reported high
Sloane: The Split Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the True Purp
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993
490 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
on whether punitive damages have become overused in our legal system and
whether the awards have become astronomical.
The split award statute is not a measure created to support one view or the
other.' Rather, the split award statute is an attempt to actualize the true
purpose of punitive damages: specifically, to improve the quality of life in
society by punishing and deterring the egregious conduct of defendants.
Therefore, the split award statute maintains the punishment function of punitive
damages that ultimately benefits society, while disgorging plaintiffs of any
potential windfall." The only real connection the split award statutes have to
the tort reform movement is that attention became focused on the award of
punitive damages because a belief emerged that punitive damage awards had
become large and frequent." For this reason, states began experimenting and
tinkering with the award of punitive damages to reduce the plaintiffs windfall
and improve the perception of punitive damage awards.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SPLr AWARD STATUTE
The split award statute, and its enactment in nine states, is the product of
the public's perception that reform of the award of punitive damages is
jury awards had a split award statute, the problem of reduced services could be resolvable.
Specifically, if a portion of the $20 billion was awarded to a state fund pursuant to a split award
statute, then the "higher-risk" women would be able to obtain the services required to insure quality
obstetrics care. For example, when a "high risk" woman required a Caesarian section procedure,
the split award fund would be available to pay the higher costs charged by the profession before her
case would be accepted. Additionally, when a woman in Georgia would be in need of Ob-Gyn
services, she could obtain money from the split award fund for travel expenses that would allow her
travel to a county that would provide these essential services. For an additional'illustration of how
the split award statute benefits all of society, see infra note 222 and accompanying text.
92. Admittedly, at least one state legislature has cited in its legislative history that a motivating
factor contributing to the enactment of the split award statute was an attempt to deter plaintiffs from
seeking punitive damage awards. House of Representatives Committee on Health Care and
Insurance Staff Analysis: Tort Reform and Insurance, Fla. ch. 86-160, SB465 at § 70. However,
regardless of the motivation, attention must be focused on what the split award statute actually does.
In Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 797 P.2d 1019 (Or. 1990), the Oregon Supreme Court
specifically noted that the split award statute was meant only to affect the distribution of a punitive
damage award, not whether or how much of an award should be made. Id. at 1021.
93. Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiffs Windfall From Punitive Damage Litigation,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1900 (1992) (as funded by the John M. Olin foundation). This article engages
in an extremely technical economical analysis of how the split award statute effectively alleviates the
plaintiff's windfall problem associated with the award of punitive damages. Id. at 1911.
Essentially, the note sets forth an economic formula wherein the plaintiff receives compensatory and
litigation costs while the state receives the defendant's punitive damage award minus litigation costs.
Id. In addition, the article presents the tax ramifications of punitive damage awards. Id. at 1917.
94. See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text discussing the two perspectives as to the
validity of this perception.
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needed.9" The split award statute is also an attempt at effectuating the true
purpose of maintaining societal order through the award of punitive damages.
The nine states that have enacted split award statutes include: Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Oregon, and Utah."
A primary benefit of the split award statute is to create a disincentive for
seeking punitive damages unless the claim is truly meritorious.' The specific
disincentive is to remove the temptation of the plaintiff seeking a windfall.
Additionally, the split award statute tends to return the award of punitive
damages to its original intended purpose by "visiting financial distress on
wickedness [that] serves a public purpose."' This objective is achieved by
awarding a set percentage of all punitive damage awards to the state. Such a
"funnelling" process also allows the public to receive some compensation for the
losses it suffered as a result of the defendant's outrageous conduct."
A. The Distribution Question
The question of how much of the award should be "funnelled" to the public
has been answered differently by the states that have enacted split award
statutes. In fact, a spectrum has emerged among these states. The far left of
the spectrum provides that the majority of the punitive damage award should be
made to the state."im For example, both the Georgia and Iowa statutes require
that seventy-five percent of the award must be remitted to the state, while
Florida receives a sixty percent share of all punitive damages awarded in the
state.
At the other extreme, the most conservative split award statute entitles the
state to a one-third share of the punitive damage judgment. Only the Colorado
legislature has enacted this conservative approach. Finally, the middle of the
road is occupied by those states that make an even fifty-fifty split of the
award. 1o1
95. See supra section I.
96. See supra note 24 for the statutory citation of each state. The legislative history materials
concerning why these states have enacted the split award statute, for the most part, are not available.
Therefore, what follows is an analysis of what can be gleaned from reading the statutory language
and related articles offering possible rationales.
97. See MINZER Er AL., supra note 41, at § 40.06.
98. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (1986). The quoted material comes from the
historical and practice notes following the statutory language.
99. See MINZER ET AL., supra note 41, at § 40.06.
100. Florida, Georgia, and Iowa occupy this end of the spectrum. For specific statutory cites
of each particular states, see supra note 24.
101. A slight plurality of the states fall into this category that include: Kansas, Missouri,
Oregon, and Utah.
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Only one state, Illinois, does not fit neatly into a particular category on the
spectrum. The reason for this peculiarity is that Illinois' split award statute
provides no specified percentage breakdown of the judgment." Instead, the
statute affords the trial court judge discretion to determine what, if any, special
distribution scheme should take place among the plaintiff, the state, and the
plaintiff's attorney, with regard to the punitive damage award."°e Although
this construction creates the potential for uncertainty as to where on the
spectrum the distribution will fall, Illinois' statute is still useful in achieving the
goals behind the split award statutes."°  Specifically, the plaintiff must still
consider whether the time, money, and effort associated with seeking a punitive
damage award is worthwhile. 5
102. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1207 (1986).
103. Id.
104. Justice Janie L. Shores, an Alabama Supreme Court Justice, suggests that it is within the
court's "inherent authority to allocate punitive damage awards without legislation directing such
allocation." Janie L. Shores, A Suggestionfor Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of Punitive Damage
Awards to Eliminate Windfa//s, 44 ALA. L. REv. 61,90 (1992). In particular, Justice Shores asserts
that the courts have broad powers to "shape and effectuate remedies [that are] deeply rooted in the
common law system." Id. at 91. She further contends that punitive damage awards are subject to
the exercise of this inherent authority. Id. Justice Shores finds that the punitive damage award
distribution plan must be restructured so that the defendant's harm against society is redressed
through the award of punitive damages. Id. at 91-92. Essentially, Justice Shores encourages courts
to exercise their inherent authority to split the award of punitive damages between the plaintiff and
the state when the judge finds that the facts of the case mandate such a distribution. Id. at 93.
Justice Shores also establishes a specific procedural analysis a court should implement when a
punitive damage award has been made to determine if a special distribution of the award is
appropriate. Id. at 92-94.
Justice Shores contends that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant could set forth a valid
complaint because of the realignment of the punitive damage award that allows the state to receive
a portion. Id. at 91. She notes that the plaintiff has no basis for argument because the plaintiff has
no vested constitutional right to receive the entire punitive damage award. Id. Meanwhile, as
Justice Shores notes, the defendant has no complaint because regardless of who receives the award,
the defendant is still obligated to pay. Id. Therefore, although Justice Shores suggests a different
source of authority to implement the split award scheme, she and this Note reach the same
conclusion. The split award system is necessary to allow society to receive compensation for the
losses suffered because of the defendant's conduct. Id. at 93.
This article is a natural follow-up to her concurring opinion in Fuller v. Preferred Risk Life
Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 878, 886-87 (Ala. 1991) (Shores, J., concurring), wherein she suggested that
a split of the punitive damage award should be made between the plaintiff and the state. Recently,
in Smith v. States General Life Ins. Co., 592 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. 1992), the court implemented
Justice Shores' approach. The court divided the punitive damage award equally between the plaintiff
and the American Heart Association. Id. at 1024.
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1207 (1986). The legislative history following the statute
indicates that the Illinois legislature's intent behind the split award statute was to create this cost-
benefit analysis. Id.
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B. Attorneys Fees Computation
A factor to consider when determining whether a punitive damage award
is worth pursuing under the split award statute concerns when and how the
computation of attorneys fees takes place."' 6 A clear majority of the states
provides that before any division of the punitive damage award is made between
the plaintiff and the state, reasonable attorney fees should be deducted from the
judgment. These states include: Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Oregon, and
Utah. Only Florida's split award statute requires that the attorney fees be paid
out of the claimant's own share of the judgment."e
C. The Recipient of the Funds
In addition to the difficulties posed by the percentage distribution questions,
a consensus has not been reached among the states with respect to which entity
within the state should be the recipient of the state's share of the bounty. For
example, the most generic distribution scheme, as implemented by Colorado,
Georgia, and Utah, simply places the state's percentage in a general state
fund. " Other state statutes dictate that the award be used on particular
programs. For instance, Kansas requires that the monies be put towards health
care stabilization;"° the Oregon statute provides that a Criminal Injuries
Compensation Account receive the state's share;" and Missouri's split award
statute creates a special fund, the Tort Victims' Compensation Fund, to be the
recipient of the state's monies."'
Two of the states have particularly unique disbursement schemes. The
Iowa split award statute, classified earlier in this Note as "far left," leaves open
the opportunity that the plaintiff may receive the entire punitive damage
award." 2 However, if the jury finds that the plaintiff is not entitled to the full
punitive damage judgment, then a civil reparation trust fund receives the state's
106. Typically, the plaintiff has previously agreed to pay the attorney a fixed percentage of the
award. Honeywell, 797 P.2d at 1022.
107. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(a)(4) (West 1986).
108. For the specific language of the statutes, see: COLO REv. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (West
1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (1987); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1989).
109. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (1988).
110. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(3) (1987).
111. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 537.675(1) (1987).
112. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.l(l)(b) (West 1987), requires that the jury answer a special
interrogatory to determine whether the defendant's outrageous conduct was "directed specifically at
the claimant . . . .' Finding in the affirmative, the jury must then award the plaintiff the full
punitive damage judgment as provided for by § 2(a). In the event the jury finds that the defendant's
egregious conduct was more a crime against the public welfare, then the state receives 75 % of the
award. Id.
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seventy-five percent share of the award." 3 The Florida split award statute
also offers a unique disbursement alternative. Under the Florida statute, the
cause of action before the court is the determining factor as to where the state's
share will eventually be awarded. 14
D. State's Interest
One area in which most of the existing split award statutes agree is when
the state's interest in the judgment attaches. Four out of the nine statutes
contain specific language stating that the state's interest does not become active
until judgment is entered for the plaintiff."5 In essence, such language creates
a judgment creditor status for the state, thus entitling the state to a percentage
of the proceeds from the punitive damage award, yet prohibits the state from
actually becoming a party to the suit or becoming actively involved in any of the
judicial proceedings." 6 This type of statutory construction is necessary to
avoid conflict with the Excessive Fines Clause of the Constitution."7 By
limiting the state's role to the status ofjudgment creditor, the applicability of the
Browning-Ferris"' decision acting as a barrier to the split award statute is
questionable. 9
Since the first split award statutes were enacted in 1986, in Colorado and
Florida, quite a bit of tinkering has occurred within those states."n In 1987,
the American Bar Association endorsed the concept of the split award statute;
therefore, more statutes and variations can be expected.'' Also, within the
last five years, some of the statutes discussed above have undergone judicial
113. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2)(b) (West 1987).
114. If the claim pertains to personal injury or wrongful death, the state's share is placed in a
Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund. All other claims are placed in a General Revenue Fund.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b) (West 1986).
115. For the specific language from the statute, see: COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (West
1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (e)(2) (1987); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675 (3) (1987); and OR.
REV. STAT. § 18.540(1) (1987).
116. Eurlich v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 798 P.2d 715 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (holdingthat the state
had no right to interfere with the prosecution of the action for punitive damages because the state
had no interest in the case until a fund capable of distribution was created by entry of judgment).
117. For a discussion of the Excessive Fines problem in relation to the split award statute, see
infra section V.B. notes and accompanying text,
118. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
119. For a discussion of the Excessive Fines problem in relation to the split award statute, see
infra section V.B. notes and accompanying text.
120. The divergence of views emerging from only these nine states and their respective statutes
illustrates the fact that a set formula for the split award statute has not been established. See supra
notes 95-119 and accompanying text.
121. MINZER El" AL., supra note 41, at § 40.06.
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scrutiny,' " thus making the path to constructing a more effective split award
statute attainable by correcting prior mistakes. In the section that follows, the
major relevant case law will be analyzed.
V. RELEVANT CASE LAW EVALUATING SPLrr AWARD STATUTES
To date, five of the nine existing split award statutes have undergone
judicial scrutiny. Two of the statutes have been struck down on constitutional
grounds. " Interestingly, the three remaining statutes have been upheld
despite similar constitutional challenges."Z The other main issue concerning
the split award statute addressed by the courts has been the jury instruction
question. "
A. The Takings Clause
In 1991, the Supreme Court of Colorado struck down the state's
conservative split award statute on the grounds that the state's share amounted
to an unconstitutional taking. In Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., the court
examined Colorado's split award statute, which awarded one-third of any
punitive damage award to the state."2 The court, in striking the statute down,
limited its discussion to the constitutional takings issue."2
The Kirk court conceded that no bright line test existed to determine what
constituted a "taking" of property; 2 however, the court did consider a
number of factors in making its decision."3  First, the character of the
governmental action was given consideration.13' As to this factor, the court
held that the split award statute was an unsuccessful attempt by the legislature
122. See infra section V notes and accompanying text.
123. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 126-41, 160-71 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 142-56, 172-80 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
126. 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
127. Id. at 266. In Krk, the plaintiff received a punitive damage judgment against the
defendant. While agreeing to accept a reduced punitive damage award in lieu of a new trial, the
plaintiff was challenging the state's receipt of one-third of the bounty. Id. at 263.
128. Id. at 265. Other issues were raised on appeal; however, the court found that the Takings
Clause provided sufficient grounds to invalidate the statute. Id.
129. Id. at 267.
130. Id. at 268. The court compiled these factors based on the decision in Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 968, 1005 (1984).
131. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 268.
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to impose a user fee on plaintiffs who had obtained a punitive damage
award.," Second, the court determined the economic impact of the govern-
mental action.'33  In the case of the split award statute, the court found that
the economic impact was nothing "less than substantial.""u And finally, the
court was concerned with how the governmental action would interfere with the
plaintiff's reasonable economic expectation with regard to the property
affected. "
The court primarily concerned itself with the third factor. In assessing the
plaintiff's reasonable economic expectation, the court rendered a literal
interpretation of the statutory language." The court found that the state never
obtained an interest in the award prior to the judgment being entered and the
monies being collected from the defendant. 3 Such a procedure, the court
held, was an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiff's vested property right."
The court also cited the state's disclaimer of any interest in the suit until
after such events occurred as further support that the plaintiff's expectation to
the full judgment was reasonable. 39 For these reasons, the court invalidated
132. Id. at 271. The court noted that for a user fee to be valid, the charge must "bear some
reasonable relationship to the overall cost of that service.' Id. Here, the court held that the split
award statute constituted an invalid user fee because of the "gross disproportion between the
statutory forced contribution and any government service made available to the [plaintiffl." Id. at
273.
133. Id. at 268.
134. Id. at 272. The court reasoned that the plaintiff obtained a vested right to the entire
punitive damage award under Colorado's split award statute. Id. Therefore, the court held that the
subsequent requirement that the plaintiff surrender one-third of the judgment to the state entailed a
severe economical impact. Id.
135. Id. at 268.
136. Id. at 266. In relevant part, the statute provides, "One-third of all reasonable damages
collected pursuant to this section shall be paid into the general state fund. The remaining two-thirds
of such damages collected shall be paid to the injured party. Nothing in this subsection (4) shall be
construed to give the general fund any interest in the claim for exemplary damages or in the
litigation itself at any time prior to payment becoming due." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 13-21-102(4)
(West 1986).
137. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 266. Admittedly, applying the plain meaning rule to the Colorado
statute, it appears that the state requires the plaintiff to spend the time, effort, and money in actually
obtaining the judgment and payment, then is expected to surrender one-third of the bounty to the
state. Under this analysis, the split award statute does violate the Takings Clause because the
plaintiff is being required to actually collect payment from the defendant, thus having obtained legal
title to the monies, and then must remit a one-third portion to the state.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 272. Here again, the wording of Colorado's statute creates the constitutional
difficulties. The court noted that "the state's asserted interest is not in the judgment itself but in the
monies collected on the judgment, and the interest arises only at the point in time after the judgment
creditor's property in the judgment has vested by operation of law." Id.
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the Colorado statute as an unconstitutional taking." °  Following the Kirk
decision, not all split award statutes fell prey to the Takings Clause. The
Colorado split award statute was struck down because of the unique linguistic
and procedural difficulties associated with how the state obtained its share of the
award. 141
The viability of split award statutes, despite the Takings Clause challenge,
was evidenced by a Florida Appellate Court in Gordon v. State, 42 also
decided in 1991, upholding the Florida split award statute. 43 The Gordon
decision was subsequently affirmed, in late 1992, in a per curiam opinion issued
by the Florida Supreme Court." The court flatly rejected the plaintiff's
Takings Clause argument." The court reasoned that no property interest was
being taken from the plaintiff because the plaintiff held no protectable right to
the inchoate claim of a punitive damage award." The court also noted that
punitive damages, unlike compensatory damages that are awarded as of right,
are not a matter of right; rather, punitive damages were awarded and justifiable
because of public policy considerations. 47 Therefore, the court reasoned that
the state acted within its purview, as the ultimate policy maker, to codify and
regulate the plaintiff's right to punitive damages.'48
140. Id. at 273.
141. See supra notes 137, 139 and accompanying text.
142. 585 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
143. Id. In Gordon, the plaintiff received a punitive damage award from K-Mart after having
been falsely imprisoned by the store. Upon entry of an amended final judgment, the court entered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff as to 40% of the punitive damage award, while the state received
judgment to the remaining 60% of the bounty. Id. at 1035.
144. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3667 (1993).
In a fairly brief opinion, the court was in complete agreement with the Appellate Court concerning
the constitutionality of the split award statute. The court supported the lower court's reasoning that
the split award statute did not constitute a taking because the plaintiff had no vested right to recover
punitive damages. Id. at 801. In further concurring with the Appellate Court, the Florida Supreme
Court explained that the right to have punitive damages awarded "is not property." Id. Therefore,
the court reasoned that the state, as ultimate policymaker, had the "plenary authority" to regulate
an inchoate claim topunitive damages "or even abolish it altogether." Id. The court concluded that
the Florida Legislature's action was rationally related to the legislative objectives of compensating
the public and discouraging the abuse of claiming punitive damages by making their award less
attractive to plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys. Id. at 802. Therefore, the court upheld Florida's
split award statute. Id.
145. Gordon, 585 So. 2d at 1035. In the Gordon case, unlike the K/rk case, the plaintiff
obtained a vested right to only 40% of the punitive damage award. Id. The state obtained a vested
interest to the 60% immediately upon entry of the judgment against the defendant. Id. Also unlike
Kir*, in Gordon, the state was responsible for the collection of payment.
146. Id. at 1036.
147. Id. at 1035.
148. Id. at 1036. The court suggested that the state could completely eliminate the award of
punitive damages if it so desired. For the states that have adopted this position, see supra note 62
and accompanying text.
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Applying a minimal scrutiny test to the Florida split award statute, the
Gordon court found that the state had a legitimate interest in returning the use
of punitive damages to its original intended purpose. 49  The court further
recognized that awarding a percentage of the punitive damage award to the state
assisted in effectuating the public policy goals of the legislature by allowing the
public, as represented by the state, to receive compensation for the losses
suffered. " The Gordon court also accepted the legislative history's
justification for this statute.' Again giving deference to the legislature as
ultimate maker of public policy, the court found no difficulty with a statute
enacted for the purpose of discouraging the filing of punitive damage
claims. 15
2
Florida, however, was not the only state to reject the Kirk court's decision
and instead hold that a split award statute does not violate the Takings Clause.
In Shepherd Components v. Brice Petrides,'53 a 1991 case analyzing Iowa's
split award statute, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld an award of seventy-five
percent of a punitive damage award to the state's civil reparation fund. I" In
Shepherd, the court held that the plaintiff had no vested right to the recovery of
149. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 1036 (Fla. 1992). The court explained that the primary
purpose of punitive damages is to vindicate public wrongs and to protect the public from similar
egregious conduct in the future. Id. The net effect of achieving this purpose is to compensate
society for the losses suffered because of the defendant's egregious conduct and maintain social order
in the future.
150. Id. at 1037. In this respect, the court also seemed to imply that the plaintiff should feel
fortunate to receive any of the punitive damage award. Id. at 1037 n.5. This point is reinforced
in a state adopting the Illinois split award statute approach. Because under the Illinois wild card
approach, the trial court judge has the absolute discretion in determining how, if any, distribution
takes place between the plaintiff and the state. Therefore, nothing would seem to prevent the judge
from awarding the entire punitive damage award to the state. Under this analysis, the Florida
plaintiff should feel fortunate that 40% of the award is guaranteed to end up with the plaintiff.
Under the Illinois approach, the plaintiff has no such guarantee.
151. Id. Florida's legislative history cited dramatically rising commercial liability insurance
rates, complete lack of insurance coverage, and high jury awards as the motivating factors to
enacting the tort reform legislation. House of Representatives Committee on Health Care and
Insurance Staff Analysis: Tort Reform and Insurance, Fla. ch. 86-160, SB465 at § 70. The
legislature expected that the limitations placed on non-economic damage awards, like punitive
damages, would help release some tensions in the insurance industry. Id.
In particular, 4he statute was enacted with the hope that limits on non-economic damages would
lower insurance ratles because presumably costs to the insurance provider would be lowered by the
limits. Id. Additionally, the legislature believed that the limits placed on punitive damages and
other non-economic damages might possibly encourage settlements therefore reducing litigation
costs. Id.
152. Gordon, 585 So. 2d at 1037.
153. 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991).
154. Id. In Shepherd, the plaintiff challenged the state's receipt of any of the punitive damage
award. The plaintiff claimed a vested property right in the judgment and advocated that a taking
without just compensation violated his due process rights. Id.
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punitive damages. 5 The court reasoned that because punitive damages are
a statutorily created right, the manner with which the monies were distributed
was subject to legislative codification without offending any constitutional
provisions. "
As Gordon and Shepherd indicate, the Takings Clause does not seem to be
an insurmountable barrier to the split award statute. However, the Kirk decision
makes it clear that both the procedure implemented to obtain the monies and
exactly when the state's interest attaches to the judgment are two crucial
elements of a successful split award statute. To withstand a Takings Clause
challenge, the statute must provide the state with an interest to its portion of the
monies immediately upon entry of the judgment. 57 Further, it is crucial that
the state be responsible for collecting its own share of the award."'8 The Kirk
decision indicates that leaving this task to the plaintiff would create a vested
property right in any of the monies obtained by the plaintiff. Therefore, the
required remission of a portion of that money to the state would violate the
Takings Clause. 59
155. Id. at 619. The contention that punitive damages are not a matter of right is not a novel
concept to the Iowa courts. In Claude v. Weaver Conat. Co., 158 N.W.2d 139, 143 (Iowa 1968),
the Iowa Supreme Court rather strongly asserted:
[The award of such damages constitutes an effective deterrent to such offenders, and
a salutary protection to society and the public in general. They are not recoverable as
a matter of right and are only incidental to the main cause of action, and can be awarded
only when actual and substantial damages are allowed. They are in no way
compensatory, and while they have a secondary purpose in adding to the complainant's
award because injury to him may well have been aggravated by its malicious,
oppressive, willful, wanton, or reckless causation, yet, whatever benefit he so receives
comes to him not as compensation for the wrong done him but as purely incidental and
by the grace and gratuity of the law, as punishment of the wrongdoer, and as an
example and deterrent to others.
Id. at 143. The court, therefore, identified the plaintiff as a fortuitous beneficiary of the punitive
damage award and reinforced the fact that society is really meant to be benefitted through the award
of such damages. Id.
The acknowledgement that punitive damages are not a matter of right is not limited to Iowa.
See, e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 683 P.2d 670, 676 (Cal. 1984);
Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Sevrs., 789 P.2d 541, 555 (Kan. 1990).
156. Shepherd, 473 N.W.2d at 619. The Shepherd court candidly stated that in the past
punitive damages were always awarded to the plaintiff because no one else ever laid claim to the
award. Id. For this reason, the Court dubbed the plaintiffs "fortuitous beneficiary" of the award.
Id. Like the Gordon court, the Shepherd court seemed to be implying that the plaintiff should feel
fortunate to be receiving any portion. of the punitive damage award.
157. Ki*k, 818 P.2d at 266.
158. Id. at 272.
159. Id.
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B. The Excessive Fines Clause
A second major stumbling block that has been cited to strike down the split
award statute is the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause. " This
constitutional concern has become especially salient because of the Supreme
Court decision in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc."" The
Browning-Ferris decision was a landmark case because it firmly established the
constitutionality of awarding punitive damages in civil proceedings, rejecting the
Excessive Fines Clause challenge. The Supreme Court set forth specific
guidelines as to what circumstances did not violate the Excessive Fines
Clause. "a Specifically, the Court limited the non-applicability of the
Excessive Fines Clause to punitive damage awards when private parties were
involved. "
Citing this specific limitation, a United States District Court, in McBride
v. General Motors Corp., struck down the Georgia split award statute. '6 The
court found that the state's entitlement to seventy-five percent of the punitive
damage award was a violation of due process and in contravention of the
Excessive Fines Clause.'s The court further found that the split award statute
was a poorly disguised attempt to discourage the identification of public wrongs
160. McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990). The McBride
decision was the first case to delve into an analysis of the split award statute. The case has been
acknowledged in each of the previously mentioned decisions concerning split award statutes.
161. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
162. See supra note 23 and accompanying text for an explanation of the guidelines.
163. Id. at 260. The Court further made mention of the fact that the government could not be
directly involved in the imposition of the punitive damages. Id. at 275. However, the split award
statute does not violate this condition because the state is not directly imposing a fine against the
defendant. As mentioned in section IV where the split award statute was analyzed, the state is
prohibited, expressly in most statutes, from becoming an active participant in the lawsuit. Rather,
the state's role is limited to receiving a portion of the award after the court has entered judgment
against the defendant.
164. 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
165. The plaintiff in McBride sued GM for a defective product liability claim. Specifically, the
complaint challenged Georgia's statutory provision that limited recovery of punitive damages to a
one-time award when products liability was the basis of the claim. The plaintiff also claimed that
the state's status as a non-party judgment creditor to 75% of the punitive damage award was a
violation of the Excessive Fines Clause.
Interestingly, the Georgia split award statute, unlike the other split award statutes, was limited
in application to products liability claims. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1)-(2) (1987).
Ultimately, this specificity contributed to the demise of the statute because the court found that such
a distinction between the tort claims was arbitrarily discriminatory. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1569.
Only Florida's split award statute has a similar procedure wherein the type of claim is even at issue;
however, under hZiorida's satute the distinction between the actions determines where the money is
distributed, not vhether a special distribution of the punitive damage award should take place. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 708.73(2)(b) (West 1986).
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committed by big business" because the statute reduced the incentive to
litigate punitive damage claims. 67
In striking down the Georgia statute, the court relied heavily on the
Browning-Ferris decision." The McBride court, however, neglected to
acknowledge the Supreme Court's express reservation of the issue whether the
Excessive Fines Clause should apply to the states via incorporation.16'
Instead, the McBride court unilaterally decided that the Clause did apply, and
therefore, struck down the split award statute. The court held that the statute,
by creating a right for the state to seventy-five percent of the bounty, had
explicitly violated the rule set forth in Browning-Ferris by imposing a fine on
behalf of government." The court further reasoned that such a provision
would constitute raising revenue in unfair ways by the government, therefore
violating the Excessive Fines Clause.""
Like the Takings Clause issue, a split among the states has developed
concerning the Excessive Fines Clause acting as a barrier to the viability of split
166. The court rejected the state's justification that the split award statute was a valid revenue-
raising effort or that the statute was necessary to maintain business viability within Georgia.
McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1568.
167. Such reasoning by the district court is truly faulty and basically amounts to an admission
by the judge that punitive damages have become the object of misuse. The measurement of punitive
damages focuses on the outrageous or egregious nature of the defendant's conduct, not the dollar
figure the plaintiff obtains from the judgment. Further, the Georgia split award statute still allows
plaintiffs to receive 25% more than they are really entitled to because, theoretically, plaintiffs are
considered whole upon receipt of compensatory damages. In this respect, plaintiffs have technically
received a windfall when a punitive damage award of one dollar is awarded. Therefore, receiving
a 25 % windfall of the overall punitive damage award should be considered enough of an incentive
to encourage plaintiffs to bring meritorious claims. At the same time, the plaintiff's incentive to
bring a "not so valid" claim with the hope of hitting the proverbial "punitive damage award lottery"
will rightfully be reduced.
168. Id. at 1577-78. The court quoted heavily from the Browning-Ferris opinion and repeatedly
emphasized the Supreme Court's limitation of the precedential value of the case to private parties
and where the government had no share of the recovery. Id. at 1577.
Interestingly, the McBride court never addressed the Takings Clause argument. It appears
from the opinion that no challenge to the statute was made on those grounds. The only mention of
a vested property right in the award was raised by the defendant in light of a standing challenge.
Id. at 1573.
The defendant claimed that because the plaintiff had no vested right to an inchoate claim, the
split award statute could not be challenged. Id. The court rejected this contention. Id. Meanwhile,
the issue concerning the state's status as non-party judgment creditor was summarily declared
unconstitutional because the court found such a status to be arbitrary and without a rational basis.
Id. at 1578.
169. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 276 n.22.
170. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1578.
171. Id.
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award statutes."t2 In Burke v. Deere & Co.," a case decided a year after
the McBride decision, an Iowa district court rejected the applicability of the
Excessive Fines Clause to the split award statute. 4 The Burke court
reconciled its holding with the McBride decision by drawing a distinction
between the two split award statutes, noting that the entity receiving. the state's
share differed within the respective states.'" The court explained that in
Georgia, the state treasury was the direct recipient of the award, whereas in
Iowa the split award statute dictated that the court receive and administer the
monies. 76 The court found that judicial administration of the monies received
under the split award statute removed the need to subject the statute to a
Browning-Ferris analysis." 7
The court's attempt to distinguish the Iowa statute from the Georgia statute
is tenuous at best. It seems that the Burke court realized that the McBride
decision was erroneous in allowing the split award statute to be struck down
based on the Excessive Fines Clause. Therefore, the Burke court drew a
distinction that is really without a difference to avoid being in direct conflict
with the McBride decision. It is difficult to fathom how the court came to the
conclusion that the state's judicial system is not really an arm of the state,
considering the fact that all judges and related support staff are in fact paid by
the state. Nonetheless, the Burke court's ultimate holding that the Excessive
Fines Clause does not invalidate the split award statute is correct. However, the
court did not have to draw such a meaningless distinction to come to the same
conclusion. "
Instead, the Burke court had two more logical analyses to choose from.
First, the court could have found that the state was not a party to the action; and
therefore, the Browning-Ferris limitation would not -be implicated.'" The
Iowa statute is particularly amenable to this analysis because of the two-step
172. For example, the Florida district court, in Gordon, recognized and then summarily
dismissed the McBride decision that struck down Georgia's split award statute because of the
Excessive Fines Clause. Gordon, 585 So. 2d at 1037 n.9. The court found that the McBride
decision was "completely unpersuasive." Id.
173. 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
174. Id.
175. Specifically, the court noted that the Georgian split award statute placed the "funnelled"
funds into the state's treasury. Id. at 1242. The Iowa split award statute, on the other hand,
provides that the monies be remitted to a civil reparation trust fund. IOWA CODE ANN. §
668A.1(2)(b) (West 1987).
176. Burke, 780 F. Supp. at 1242.
177. Id. For a discussion of the Browning-Ferris decision, see supra notes 161-63 and
accompanying text.
178. For the alternative argument, see infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 23 and accompanying text for discussion of what the Browning-Ferris
limitation entails.
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process involved with activating the state's interest under the split award
distribution scheme. "
Alternatively, the Burke court, as well as any other court addressing an
Excessive Fines challenge, could uphold the state's receipt of a portion of the
award, under the split award statute, by finding that the award is not
excessive. '' Under either analysis, the Excessive Fines Clause should no
longer be an obstacle to the split award statute. Therefore, the split award
statute can continue to carry out the true purpose of punitive damages by
punishing and deterring defendants in the interest of improving society.
C. The Jury Instruction Question
The final concern associated with the split award statute is how to deal with
the jury instruction question. In 1990, the Oregon Supreme Court addressed this
question directly in Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co."s The court held that
the jury had been erroneously instructed about Oregon's split award statute. 83
The Honeywell court reasoned that informing the jury about the use of the award
would not in any way assist the jury with proper deliberation.'8 ' Rather, the
court feared that this type of instruction would act as a diversion to the jury,
thus distracting their attention from the task at hand.sa Specifically, the jury
must concentrate on deciding the case before it.
In particular, the Honeywell court had two main concerns. '" First, the
180. Specifically pertinent to this discussion, the state's share, under Iowa's split award statute,
vests only after the jury finds that the claimant was not the specific target of the defendant's conduct.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A. 1 (2)(b) (West 1987). For a more detailed discussion of this process, see
supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
181. For a more detailed discussion, see Infra notes 205-211 and accompanying text.
182. 797 P.2d 1019 (Or. 1990). The plaintiffs had received both compensatory and punitive
damage judgments against the defendant. The jury instruction issue was raised by the defendant
after the jury had already been informed of the special distribution procedure associated with the
award of punitive damages under Oregon's split award statute.
183. Id. at 1022. As was the case in McBride and in Burke, no constitutional challenge was
made of the statute on the grounds of an invalid taking. Further, the Honeywell court never
addressed the issue of the Excessive Fines Clause. In fact, absolutely no challenge was reported as
to the validity of the split award statute per se. Rather, the case focused only on the jury instruction
question.
184. Id. at 1021.
185. Id.
186. An additional difficulty that could be encountered because of jury instructions that explain
the distribution procedure would be the belief that the jurors will obtain a tax break. Pro and Con:
Should Punitive Damages Be Paid to State Funds, PUNmVE DAMAGES UPDATE (ATRA,
Washington, D.C.). The American Tort Reform Association's (ATRA) briefing paper analyzing the
validity of the split award statute concept cited this problem as a potential difficulty with
implementing the statute. Id. ATRA contends that jurors may be induced to inflate the punitive
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court believed that instructing the jury as to how the final award would be
distributed created the potential for even higher jury verdicts."8 The court
reasoned that the jury may predetermine that the plaintiff should be entitled to
a particular figure." Then, the court predicted, the jury would increase the
overall punitive damage award to match that sum.' Second, the Honeywell
court perceived a more serious problem. The court feared that a "Good Cause"
syndrome would develop."g' Specifically, the court explained that jurors might
inflate the punitive damage award to provide more monies to the fund receiving
the state's share if the jurors empathized with the goal of the fund.'9 ' Such
a practice would not comply with the purposes for awarding punitive damages.
Therefore, the jury should not be instructed as to the special distribution plan
that will take place after the verdict has been rendered.
VI. A MODEL SPLrr AWARD STATUTE
The debate over whether the reform of punitive damages is a necessary
element of the tort reform movement will not be resolved any time in the near
future."9  However, the concept of the split award statute is not contingent
upon the existence of an insurance liability crisis or juries returning verdicts that
render astronomical punitive damage awards."9  Instead, the split award
statute is a useful method of effectuating the true purpose of punitive damages:
to preserve social order. By punishing a defendant's egregious conduct through
the award of punitive damages, the court's purpose is to benefit the public by
deterring others from harming members of society with similar conduct in the
future and to require the defendant to repay society for the losses incurred
because of the defendant's conduct." For this reason, punitive damages
damage award under the mistaken belief that their tax burden will be decreased. Id. This aspect
of the concern is not really focused on the individual jurors believing that they will receive a tax
credit personally. Rather, ATRA stressed that jurors may erroneously conclude that by increasing
the amount the defendants have to pay into the state programs they will ultimately reduce the citizen
tax burden. Id. This problem would be particularly present when the defendant is a wealthy out-of-
state corporation. Id.





192. For a discussion of the debate, see supra notes 65-90 and accompanying text.
193. For a full discussion of the insurance crisis and its progeny, see supra Section [[, notes
65-90 and accompanying text.
194. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 734 (1988) provides:
The intentional or reckless infliction of harm may be likened to culpable negligence in
criminal cases and authorizes the infliction of punishment which may deter future harm
to the public. So viewed, punitive damages are allowed on grounds of public policy and
in the interest of society and for the public benefit.
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always have served and will continue to serve a very important function in the
judicial system."'
The need for the split award statute arises because it is a means of truly
carrying out the message being sent by the award of punitive damages. As it
stands now in the forty-one states that do not have a split award statute, the
award of punitive damages constitutes a windfall for plaintiffs.'96 There is no
justification for allowing only one member of society to collect monies that are
awarded in the interest of society at large. Because of this inequity,"9 the
split award statute must be adopted to distribute punitive damage awards
properly. The following model statute offers a constitutional approach to
implementing a realistic split award statute that disgorges the plaintiff's windfall
and allows society to receive some benefit from punitive damage awards made
in its behalf.
Id.
195. Eshelmanv. Rawalt, 131 N.E. 675 (Ill. 1921).
mhe doctrine is too firmly rooted in our jurisprudence to be disturbed . . . and the
court recognizing the doctrine, within its proper scope, ought to exercise a high degree
of watchfulness to prevent it from being perverted and extended beyond the real
principles which it is based ....
Id. at 677. The court further explained:
[Where [punitive damages] may be assessed they are allowed in the interest of society
in the nature of punishment, and as a warning and example to deter the defendant and
others from committing like offenses in the future, and a frequent objection to the
doctrine is in allowing an individual to recover and appropriate damages for an offense
against the social order and in the interest of society.
Id.
Implementation of the split award statute accomplishes both of these goals. First, the statute
allows the punitive damage doctrine to remain a useful tool in our jurisprudence. Second, the split
award statute provides for the compensationand restoration of social order by requiring a percentage
of each punitive damage award to be paid to the state. Additionally, the split award statute gives
the court a means to prevent abuse of the doctrine by at least reducing the plaintiff's windfall, if not
eliminating it in some instances.
196. For identification of the plaintiff's windfall, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
197. Some may argue that no inequity exists because the plaintiff is the party who brings and
litigates the entire punitive damage claim; however, punitive damages have absolutely no relation
to the individual bringing the claim. Instead, the defendant's conduct is the sole focus in assessing
the award of punitive damages. Therefore, while it is true that the plaintiff brings the claim, the
ultimate award of punitive damages is based on the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct and the
extent of harm suffered by society because of that wilful, wanton conduct. For this reason, society
is entitled to receive at least a portion of the damage award ordered on its behalf.
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Section One: Distribution
Upon entry of final judgment against a defendant for an award of
punitive damages, fifty percent of such damages shall be paid to the
state treasurer, who shall become a judgment creditor as to that
amount. The remaining fifty percent of the punitive damage award
shall be paid to the prevailing party.
Commentary: A middle-of-the-road approach, splitting the award equally
between the state and the plaintiff, must be used. Realistically, the state must
continue to allow the plaintiff to receive some of the punitive damage award to
maintain the incentive for bringing such a claim. In this respect, the middle-of-
the-road approach also reinforces the common law private attorney general
theory as a justification for allowing the plaintiff to recover some of the punitive
damage award.'"
The statute must also create the judgment creditor status for the state
treasurer, immediately upon entry of judgment, to avoid the linguistic and
procedural difficulties that led to the demise of Colorado's split award
statute. 199  The state's status as judgment creditor is initially significant
because it makes the state responsible for the collection of its fifty percent share.
As the Kirk decision indicated, to withstand a Takings Clause challenge this
procedural provision is imperative to the viability of the split award statute. 2 0
The judgment creditor status and the independent collection responsibilities
assigned to the state remove any possibility for the plaintiff to argue successfully
that the split award statute constitutes an unlawful taking by the state. A
criticism that may be associated with such a procedure would be that in the
event a defendant has insufficient funds to satisfy the full judgment, the plaintiff
may be pitted against the state in the collection process. However, this should
not be viewed as problematic because once a judgment has been entered, this
situation is really no different than two private individuals pursuing the same
tortfeasor as both the plaintiff and the state are judgment creditors. Therefore,
whoever is most diligent will reap the benefit of their judgment.
The right to receive a punitive damage award is not constitutionally
protected; 20' therefore, the state has the legislative power to regulate or codify
one's entitlement to such an award. Further, a plaintiff does not receive a
vested right or property interest in a damage award until the actual entry of
198. See supra notes 19, 44-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the private attorney
general theory.
199. See supra notes 126-41 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 8, 155 and accompanying text.
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judgment against the defendant.' Given these two corollaries, it is difficult
to comprehend how a plaintiff could make a successful Takings Clause
challenge.
Once the split award statute is codified, thus giving the plaintiff notice, an
argument claiming a reasonable expectation to the entire punitive damage award
is illogical. As the United States Supreme Court set forth in Board of Regents
of State Colleges v. Roth,' "to have a property interest in a benefit, a person
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must, instead, have
a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."'
The Supreme Court has additionally held, in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York,' that simply because a government's actions may
affect an individual's economic interest, absent a showing by the plaintiff that
"the interests were sufficiently bound up with reasonable expectations," a
takings problem does not exist.' In the Penn Central decision, the Court
also expressed a desire to give deference to government actions that adjusted the
economic benefits of an individual in favor of public programming to promote
the common good.W Realigning the distribution scheme when punitive
damages are awarded is a measure designed to assist the common good. Thus,
the state's decision to enact a split award statute is worthy of judicial deference.
Therefore, this model split award statute should not pose a takings problem.
Section Two: Attorneys Fees
Calculation and payment of the prevailing party's attorney'sfees shall
be based solely on the prevailing party's fifty percent share of the
award.
Commentary: A clear majority of the existing split award statutes provide that
attorneys fees should be calculated before the division of funds between the state
202. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
203. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
204. Id. In Roth, the Court discussed property interests obtained from statutes rather than the
Constitution. In particular, the Court used the example of welfare recipients receiving their right
to entitlement from the state. Id. The award of punitive damages to plaintiffs is somewhat
analogous because the plaintiff receives the right to seek punitive damages from the state. The Court
held that welfare recipients' property interest in benefits stemmed from the state. Id. Likewise, any
property interest the plaintiff might obtain in the punitive damage award is granted and defined by
statutory terms.
205. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
206. Id. at 124-25.
207. See supra section IV and accompanying text.
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and the plaintiff occurs." e This model statute, however, requires that
plaintiffs use their own share of the award to pay attorney costs. Designing the
provision in this way is in keeping with the common law goal of having the
award of punitive damages act as a gap filler to allow the plaintiff's
compensatory award to remain intact.' This objective can be satisfied
without the need for the state to receive less so that plaintiffs can, in effect,
receive more. In addition, a strong policy argument can be made that under this
distribution scheme, wherein fifty percent of the entire award will have to be
shared between the plaintiff and the attorney, the instances of bringing punitive
damages claims with the hope of receiving a windfall will decrease.
Section Three: State's Interest
At no time during the litigation of the suit shall the state obtain any
interest in the claim for punitive damages. The state's interest shall
become activated only upon entry of final judgment and the
achievement of the judgment creditor status provided under Section (1)
of this statute.
Commentary: This provision is necessary to avoid conflict with the second
major obstacle to the split award statute, specifically a challenge based on the
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause. The statutory language expressly
prohibits state involvement in the actual suit, including the appeal process and
the possibility of settlement discussion. The intent behind the provision is to
limit the state's role and interests to that of judgment creditor only. The net
effect is to distance the state as far as possible from the actual litigation of the
action with the hope that a court would not find the state to be a party to the
case. Provided the provision is interpreted in this way, the potential problem
posed by the Browning-Ferris decision, and the justification used by the McBride
court,2"' would have no application to the statute.21'
In the alternative, if a court would choose not to adhere to that
interpretation and instead find that the Excessive Fines Clause did apply, the
split award statute would not be unconstitutional per se because of this
application. On the contrary, this Note asserts that an application of the
208. See supra section IV.B. and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
210. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
211. It is worth mentioning that no court examining the split award statute is necessarily bound
by the Browning-Ferris decision to strike that statute down because of state involvement. The Court
reserved the question of whether the Excessive Fines Clause applied to the states via incorporation
for future consideration. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22
(1989).
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Excessive Fines Clause to the split award statute would require a finding by the
court that the state's share under the statute constituted an excessive fine
imposed by government-"' In her concurring opinion in Browning-Ferris,
Justice O'Connor agreed that before a punitive damage award could be held
unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause, a determination of whether
the fines were excessive must be made.
21 3
Justice O'Connor offered "some broad guidelines" that emerged from the
Solem v. Helm 214 decision to assess when a punitive damage award is
excessive. First, Justice O'Connor provided, "substantial deference [must be
afforded] to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the
conduct at issue."2 5 Second, the court's examination of that question should
focus on the defendant's conduct and the gravity of the punitive damage
award. 2'6 Finally, Justice O'Connor suggested comparing the civil and
criminal penalties for the conduct.
2 7
In applying Justice O'Connor's framework to the split award statute, it
seems that a substantial number of awards to the state pursuant to the statute
would not be violative of the Excessive Fines Clause. First, the state is
receiving its share of the award pursuant to the legislative determination that
society should benefit from the award of punitive damages against a defendant.
As Justice O'Connor has indicated, under these circumstances, a court analyzing
the split award statute should be examining the statute under a minimal scrutiny
test. Therefore, most awards to the state should be upheld.
The second prong of O'Connor's analysis mandates that a court should
focus on the size of the punitive damage award in relation to the egregious
nature of the defendant's conduct. Under this analysis, the absolute dollar figure
awarded by the jury and the state's percentage share of the judgment are
irrelevant. Again, following this procedure to analyze the split award statute
should generally lead to a finding of constitutionality as to the state's share. The
only time the award should be struck down is upon a finding that the
punishment, in most cases an extremely high jury verdict, is excessive as related
212. Justice Shores advances a similar contention as to when a jury verdict should be deemed
excessive. Shores, supra note 104, at 92. Specifically, Shores counsels that a determination that
the verdict is excessive must "focus on the defendant insofar as the particular defendant's conduct
was concerned." Id. Justice Shores further asserts that punitive damage awards are meant to
"financially wound, but fall short of destroying the defendant.' Id. Therefore, absent a finding that
the state's share of the award is financially devastating to the defendant, the award should stand.
213. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 299-300 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
214. 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
215. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 301.
216. Id.
217. Id. This factor has limited applicability in the case of the split award statute.
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to the defendant's conduct.
Therefore, an Excessive Fines Clause challenge of the split award statute
should usually fail. A court should find that the state is not technically a party
to the action under the split award statute, thus never requiring an Excessive
Fines Clause analysis. Alternatively, if the state is found to be a party, thereby
possibly" implicating the Excessive Fines Clause, implementing Justice
O'Connor's analysis should lead to a finding that the split award statute and the
state's receipt of a share of the award does not violate the Clause.
Section Four: Jury Instruction
The jury shall not be instructed or made aware of the special
distribution scheme provided for under this statute.
Commentary: As explained in the Honeywell case,' 9 it is best not to instruct
the jury as to how the punitive damage award will be distributed following the
entry of judgment. The issue of confusing the jurors during deliberation, and
therefore, potentially contaminating thejudgment assessment process recommend
against advising the jury of the split award statute. The jury should focus solely
on the error of the defendant's ways and what damages should be assessed,
rather than concerning itself with how the distribution will occur.
Section Five: State Recipient
Upon collection of the state's share of the punitive damage award, the
state treasurer shall appropriate the monies collected from the
defendant to the governmental agency most affected by the defendant's
egregious conduct.
Commentary: This provision is a novel disbursement scheme that is intended
to maximize the true purpose behind the state receiving a share of the punitive
damage award. The possibility of simply placing the collected monies into a
general state fund' is unattractive because the nebulous nature of such a fund
gives the appearance of never really being put to use to benefit the public.
Alternatively, placing all the monies collected into a particularized governmental
fund, for example, the State Department of Rehabilitation Services,2' is only
useful for those members of society falling into the category of need addressed
218. See supra note 211.
219. See supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 108 for identification of the states that place the collected monies into a
general state fund.
221. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I10, para. 2-1207 (1986).
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in that fund. Such a procedure never takes into account whether those
individuals were subjected to the defendant's outrageous conduct.
Under this model statute, the governmental agency most affected by the
defendant's egregious conduct would be the recipient of the funds. Therefore,
the agency could directly assist those individual members of the public who were
subjected to and affected by the defendant's outrageous conduct, who, for some
reason were unable to obtain formal relief against the defendant. Additionally,
the agency could use the funding to improve facilities, safety standards, or
research and developments efforts.' Therefore, implementation of the split
award statute is the most comprehensive means available to effectuate the true
purpose of punitive damages by restoring and maintaining social order through
the imposition of this type of damage award.'
222. Perhaps an example would best illustrate the benefits of this provision. Recently, General
Motors was found guilty by a jury of having produced and maintained in the market, pickup trucks
that exploded upon side-impact. Big-Bucks Truck Stops, TImE, February 15, 1993, at 17. This
particular case involved the death of a 17-year-old boy who burned to death after his truck was
struck from the side. Id. The "visibly angry" jurors awarded $105 million in punitive damages
against GM. Id.
In the absence of a split award statute, the plaintiffs will receive the entire punitive damage
award and thus receive a windfall. However, under the model statute proposed in this note, this
substantial punitive damage award could be put to use in a way to benefit all of society, rather than
overcompensating just one family. For example, a portion of that money could be used to develop
better governmental safety standard tests that would detect such a hazardous defect. Or perhaps,
funding could be allocated to the research and development of better car frame designs that would
later be made available by the state researchers to all car companies. Arguably, all would agree that
society would benefit from the implementation of such tests and studies because all vehicles
travelling the highways, in our highly mobile society, would be safer.
Additionally, although it is unlikely that GM will go out of business because of this verdict,
theoretically the split award statute, and particularly this distribution scheme, would also solve the
"race to the courthouse door" problem created when a company becomes insolvent because of
numerous punitive damage awards. Suppose, for example, that this suit was the first of one hundred
similar suits filed against GM. Very few businesses would have the financial stamina to withstand
more than a dozen similar verdicts before having to declare bankruptcy. The remaining 88 plaintiffs
would technically be left without a remedy despite being subjected to the same hardships and injuries
as the prior twelve plaintiffs. With the model split award statute in place, these plaintiffs would be
able to receive compensation for these injuries through application to the appropriate governmental
agency responsible for distributing the split award funds. Thus, the split award statute allows
everyone affected by the defendant's outrageous conduct to receive at least some compensation for
the injuries suffered.
223. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
[Punitive damages] have been allowed in cases where the wrong complained of is
morally culpable, or is actuated by evil and reprehensible motives, not only to punish
the defendant but to deter him, as well as other who might otherwise be so prompted,
from indulging in similar conduct in the future. It is a social exemplary "remedy," not
a private compensatory remedy.
Id. at 795.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The punitive damage doctrine is a necessary component of our civil justice
system. The doctrine is an extremely effective method of compelling defendants
to redress the harms suffered by society because of the defendants' egregious
conduct. Further, the threat of similar punitive damages being imposed against
other members of society is an effective deterrent against the reoccurrence of
outrageous behavior. Keeping this type of conduct to a minimum necessarily
maximizes society's quality of life through the maintenance of social order.
Taken together, these elements comprise the true purpose behind awarding
punitive damages.
Implementation of the split award statute is a move toward effectuating this
true purpose. First, the purpose is advanced because the statute reinforces the
concept of retribution by collecting monies from defendants because of their
egregious conduct. At the same time societal order will be maintained because
other individuals will be deterred from harming society in a similar fashion.
Second, and more importantly, the split award statute effectuates the true
purpose of punitive damage awards by compensating society for the losses
suffered because of this particular defendant's egregious conduct, thereby
restoring and rehabilitating social order. Because of the benefits received from
the split award statute, this Note recommends that states that view punitive
damages as "problematic" should consider adopting the split award statute.
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